Prior studies have advanced our knowledge of the individual determinants of corporate philanthropy; however, little empirical research has been conducted on how these determinants combine to influence giving. In this study, the authors develop and test an integrated model of the relationship between firm resources and corporate philanthropy as mediated by managerial discretion and managerial values. In addition, the authors offer organizational slack as an alternative measure of organizational resources. As predicted, the results show that firm resources have a positive (...) effect on corporate philanthropy. This effect is fully mediated by managerial discretion and partially mediated by managerial values. (shrink)

This paper briefly reviews the theories that seek to explain the phenomenon of corporate charitable donations and then provides a review of the empirical issues that have arisen in previous studies in this area. The findings of an analysis of charitable donations data from the entire U.K. FTSE index for the years 1985–2000 are then reported. These findings include the observation of a time-related increase in charitable donations, which is compared with an earlier study to give a 24 year history (...) of charitable donations in the U.K. The findings note little responsiveness of the monetary value of charitable donations to the economic performance of firms. An international comparison over time against U.S. trends is also reported and shows how U.S. corporations have traditionally been more generous than U.K. firms, but that the trend in the U.S. is downwards. Membership of a U.K.-based "tithing" club (the PerCent Club) is shown to be associated with higher profit performance against non-members. Members' charitable contributions against profit are shown to be higher than the FTSE mean although short of the 0.5% target figure in "cash" terms. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of these findings in relation to the theoretical positions advanced for corporate philanthropy. (shrink)

Although corporate decision makers may justify charitable contributions on strategic grounds, extremely large corporate philanthropic contributions may beperceived by shareholders as unnecessary. If stockholders attempt to limit corporate philanthropy, then governance mechanisms should put a cap on giving amounts. Using a matched-paired sample to control for industry and company size, theauthors compared big givers and small givers. The authors find that blockholders and institutional owners limit corporate philanthropy. This suggests that high levels of corporate philanthropy may be perceived as excessive (...) by influentialstockholders, and some governance mechanisms act to curtail it. (shrink)