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The Case Against Meat

In Ben Bramble Bob Fischer (ed.), The Moral Complexities of Eating Meat. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)

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  1. The Pursuit of Unhappiness: The Elusive Psychology of Well-Being.Daniel M. Haybron - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    Dan Haybron presents an illuminating examination of well-being, drawing on important recent work in the science of happiness. He shows that we are remarkably prone to error in judgements of our own personal welfare, and suggests that we should rethink traditional assumptions about the good life and the good society.
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  • Parfit's Case Against Subjectivism.David Sobel - 2011 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume 6. Oxford University Press.
    I argue that Parfit's On What Matters does not make a compelling case against subjective accounts of reasons for action.
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  • Is It Wrong to Eat Animals?Loren Lomasky - 2013 - Social Philosophy and Policy 30 (1-2):177-200.
    Eating meat appeals, but the cost is measured in millions of slaughtered animals. This has convinced many that vegetarianism is morally superior to a carnivorous diet. Increasingly, those who take pleasure in consuming animals find it a guilty pleasure. Are they correct? That depends on the magnitude of harm done to food animals but also on what sort of a good, if any, meat eating affords people. This essay aims to estimate both variables and concludes that standard arguments for moral (...)
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  • The Unreliability of Naive Introspection.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2006 - Philosophical Review 117 (2):245-273.
    We are prone to gross error, even in favorable circumstances of extended reflection, about our own ongoing conscious experience, our current phenomenology. Even in this apparently privileged domain, our self-knowledge is faulty and untrustworthy. We are not simply fallible at the margins but broadly inept. Examples highlighted in this essay include: emotional experience (for example, is it entirely bodily; does joy have a common, distinctive phenomenological core?), peripheral vision (how broad and stable is the region of visual clarity?), and the (...)
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  • Six Theses About Pleasure.Stuart Rachels - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):247-267.
    I defend these claims: (1) 'Pleasure' has exactly one English antonym: 'unpleasure.' (2) Pleasure is the most convincing example of an organic unity. (3) The hedonic calculus is a joke. (4) An important type of pleasure is background pleasure. (5) Pleasures in bad company are still good. (6) Higher pleasures aren't pleasures (and if they were, they wouldn't be higher). Thesis (1) merely concerns terminology, but theses (2)-(6) are substantive, evaluative claims.
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  • The Distinctive Feeling Theory of Pleasure.Ben Bramble - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):201-217.
    In this article, I attempt to resuscitate the perennially unfashionable distinctive feeling theory of pleasure (and pain), according to which for an experience to be pleasant (or unpleasant) is just for it to involve or contain a distinctive kind of feeling. I do this in two ways. First, by offering powerful new arguments against its two chief rivals: attitude theories, on the one hand, and the phenomenological theories of Roger Crisp, Shelly Kagan, and Aaron Smuts, on the other. Second, by (...)
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  • Do We Know How Happy We Are? On Some Limits of Affective Introspection and Recall.Daniel M. Haybron - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):394–428.
    This paper aims to show that widespread, serious errors in the self-assessment of affect are a genuine possibility-one worth taking very seriously. For we are subject to a variety of errors concerning the character of our present and past affective states, or "affective ignorance." For example, some affects, particularly moods, can greatly affect the quality of our experience even when we are unable to discern them. I note several implications of these arguments. First, we may be less competent pursuers of (...)
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  • Animal Liberation.Bill Puka & Peter Singer - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (4):557.
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