Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Simples, Stuff, and Simple People.Ned Markosian - 2004 - The Monist 87 (3):405-428.
    Here is a question about mereological simples that I raised in a recent paper.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  • Simples.Ned Markosian - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2):213 – 228.
    Since the publication of Peter van Inwagen's book, Material Beings,1 there has been a growing body of philosophical literature on the topic of composition. The main question addressed in both van Inwagen's book and subsequent discussions of the topic is a question that van Inwagen calls "the Special Composition Question." The Special Composition Question is, roughly, the question Under what circumstances do several things compose, or add up to, or form, a single object? For the purposes of formulating a more (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   68 citations  
  • Must a Four-Dimensionalist Believe in Temporal Parts?Josh Parsons - 2000 - The Monist 83 (3):399-418.
    The following quotation, from Frank Jackson, is the beginning of a typical exposition of the debate between those metaphysicians who believe in temporal parts, and those who do not: The dispute between three-dimensionalism and four-dimensionalism, or more precisely, that part of the dispute we will be concerned with, concerns what persistence, and correllatively, what change, comes to. Three-dimensionalism holds that an object exists at a time by being wholly present at that time, and, accordingly, that it persists if it is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   71 citations  
  • The Doctrine Of Arbitrary Undetached Parts.Peter van Inwagen - 1981 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62 (April):123-137.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   100 citations  
  • Extended Simples.Peter Simons - 2004 - The Monist 87 (3):371--85.
    I argue that the assumptions that physically basic things are either mereologically atomic, or that they are continuous and there are no atoms, both face difficult conceptual problems. Both views tend to presuppose a largely unquestioned assumption, that things have parts corresponding to the geometric parts of the regions they occupy. To avoid these problems I propose a third view, that physically simple things occupy a finite volume without themselves having parts. This view is examined enough to tease out some (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations