Switch to: Citations

References in:

Virtue, emotion and attention

Metaphilosophy 41 (1-2):115-131 (2010)

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. (1 other version)Considered Judgment.Catherine Z. Elgin - 1999 - Princeton University Press.
    Philosophy long sought to set knowledge on a firm foundation, through derivation of indubitable truths by infallible rules. For want of such truths and rules, the enterprise foundered. Nevertheless, foundationalism's heirs continue their forbears' quest, seeking security against epistemic misfortune, while their detractors typically espouse unbridled coherentism or facile relativism. Maintaining that neither stance is tenable, Catherine Elgin devises a via media between the absolute and the arbitrary, reconceiving the nature, goals, and methods of epistemology. In Considered Judgment, she argues (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   157 citations  
  • The Rational Role of Perceptual Experiences.Bill Brewer - 1999 - In Perception and Reason. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Asks how exactly perceptual experiences do provide reasons for empirical beliefs. My answer is that they furnish the subject with certain essentially experiential demonstrative contents—‘that is thus’ —his grasp of which provides him with a reason to endorse them in belief. For a person's grasp of such contents, as referring to the mind‐independent objects that they do, and predicating the mind‐independent properties that they do, essentially involves his appreciation of them as the joint upshot of the way things are anyway, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   64 citations  
  • Emotion and Understanding.C. Z. Elgin - 2008 - In Georg Brun, Ulvi Doğuoğlu & Dominique Kuenzle (eds.), Epistemology and Emotions. Ashgate Publishing Company.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   69 citations  
  • Two Arguments for Sentimentalism.Justin D’Arms - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):1-21.
    ‘Sentimentalism’ is an old-fashioned name for the philosophical suggestion that moral or evaluative concepts or properties depend somehow upon human sentiments. This general idea has proven attractive to a number of contemporary philosophers with little else in common. Yet most sentimentalists say very little about the nature of the sentiments to which they appeal, and many seem prepared to enlist almost any object-directed pleasant or unpleasant state of mind as a sentiment. Furthermore, because battles between sentimentalism and its rivals have (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  • Explaining Action by Emotion.Sabine A. D.Öring - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):214-230.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   68 citations  
  • Seeing by Feeling: Virtues, Skills, and Moral Perception.Daniel Jacobson - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4):387-409.
    Champions of virtue ethics frequently appeal to moral perception: the notion that virtuous people can “see” what to do. According to a traditional account of virtue, the cultivation of proper feeling through imitation and habituation issues in a sensitivity to reasons to act. Thus, we learn to see what to do by coming to feel the demands of courage, kindness, and the like. But virtue ethics also claims superiority over other theories that adopt a perceptual moral epistemology, such as intuitionism (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   52 citations  
  • (1 other version)Sensibility theory and projectivism.Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson - 2006 - In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford handbook of ethical theory. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 186--218.
    This chapter explores the debate between contemporary projectivists or expressivists, and the advocates of sensibility theory. Both positions are best viewed as forms of sentimentalism — the theory that evaluative concepts must be explicated by appeal to the sentiments. It argues that the sophisticated interpretation of such notions as “true” and “objective” that are offered by defenders of these competing views ultimately undermines the significance of their meta-ethical disputes over “cognitivism” and “realism” about value. Their fundamental disagreement lies in moral (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  • The authority of affect.Mark Johnston - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):181-214.
    A while ago I pulled the short straw, and became chair of my department. One nice part of the job is to praise people I work with, which I can do sincerely because they are very praiseworthy. I also have to read a lot of praise by others; the familiar things—project evaluations, letters of recommendation, promotion dossiers, and so on and so forth. As a result, I have learnt to attend to praise a little more closely.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   179 citations  
  • Affective states and epistemic immediacy.Christopher Hookway - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (1-2):78-96.
    Ethics studies the evaluation of actions, agents and their mental states and characters from a distinctive viewpoint or employing a distinctive vocabulary. And epistemology examines the evaluation of actions (inquiries and assertions), agents (believers and inquirers), and their states (belief and attitudes) from a different viewpoint. Given this common concern with evaluation, we should surely expect there to be considerable similarities between the issues examined and the ideas employed in the two areas. However, when we examine most textbooks in ethics (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  • Reasons for belief, reasoning, virtues.Christopher Hookway - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (1):47--70.
    The paper offers an explanation of what reasons for belief are, following Paul Grice in focusing on the roles of reasons in the goal-directed activity of reasoning. Reasons are particularly salient considerations that we use as indicators of the truth of beliefs and candidates for belief. Reasons are distinguished from enabling conditions by being things that we should be able to attend to in the course of our reasoning, and in assessing how well our beliefs are supported. The final section (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Explaining action by emotion.Sabine A. Döring - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):214-230.
    I discuss two ways in which emotions explain actions: in the first, the explanation is expressive; in the second, the action is not only explained but also rationalized by the emotion's intentional content. The belief-desire model cannot satisfactorily account for either of these cases. My main purpose is to show that the emotions constitute an irreducible category in the explanation of action, to be understood by analogy with perception. Emotions are affective perceptions. Their affect gives them motivational force, and they (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   114 citations