In 2002 with the passing of the Euthanasia Law, Belgium became one of the few countries worldwide to legalize euthanasia. In the 18 years since the passing of the law, much has changed. We argue that in Belgium a widening of the use of euthanasia is occurring and that this can be ethically and legally problematic. This is in part related to the fact that several legal requirements intended to operate as safeguards and procedural guarantees in reality often fail to (...) operate as such. We focus on three kinds of safeguards or procedural guarantees: (1) the legally defined due care criteria for eligibility for euthanasia; (2) the consultation of a second (and sometimes third) physician; and (3) the reporting of euthanasia cases to the Federal Control and Evaluation Commission for Euthanasia. We will show how each of these three safeguards can exhibit shortcomings in theory and practice. (shrink)

we always get to this difficult conversation one way or another when I'm talking to friends who have kids with disabilities. It goes like this: "If there had been a test for autism when my wife was pregnant with our son," my close friend tells me, "she would definitely have had an abortion." He tells me this with candor because he knows I know that this does not mean that he regrets having the son, grown up now, that they do (...) have. Parents with disabled children are usually rightfully wary about engaging in such conversations, but perhaps because I have a significant congenital genetic disability myself, we talk together about this with intimacy and mutual understanding. With his reflection about what we now... (shrink)

Berger and Miller assert that race and ethnicity based cultural competence is a failure because medicine grounds its conceptualization of cultural competence on a “flawed” understanding of r...

The practice of medically assisted dying has long been contentious, and the question of what to call it has become increasingly contentious as well. Particularly among U.S. proponents of legalizing the practice, there has been a growing push away from calling it “physician‐assisted suicide,” with assertions that medically assisted dying is fundamentally different from suicide. Digging deeper into this claim about difference leads to an examination of the difference between two kinds of suffering—suffering from physical conditions and suffering from psychological (...) conditions—and therefore leads also toward an examination of whether requests for medical assistance in dying by those suffering from psychological conditions and those suffering from physical conditions should be painted with the same brush. In this article, I aim both to illuminate some of the considerations that ought to be included in discussions related to medically assisted dying and to shed light on what the indirect effects of such discussions can be. I consider some of the reasons commonly given for holding that suicide and medically assisted dying differ fundamentally and then whether the conclusion that medically assisted dying should not be called “suicide” follows from the premises. I ask what else might justify the conclusion that the two acts ought to be called by different names, and I examine possible justifications for accepting this premise, as well as what justifications might exist for emphasizing how the acts are alike. Finally, I argue that we should be cautious before concluding that medically assisted dying should not be called “suicide.” We need more evidence either that the two acts are fundamentally different or that emphasizing differences between them is not likely to do more harm than good. (shrink)

Providing a model for the transformative work that is required going forward, The Crisis of US Hospice Care illustrates the potential of hospice for facilitating a new way of living our last days and for having the best death possible.

Persons with dementia often prefer to participate in decisions about their health care, but may be prevented from doing so because healthcare decision-making law facilitates use of advance directives or surrogate decision makers for persons with decisional impairments such as dementia. Federal and state disability law provide alternative decision-making models that do not prevent persons with mild to moderate dementia from making their own healthcare decisions at the time the decision needs to be made. In order to better promote autonomy (...) and wellbeing, persons with dementia should be accommodated and supported so they can make their own healthcare decisions. (shrink)

Terminally ill patients in 10 states plus Washington, D.C. have the right to take prescribed medications to end their lives (medical aid in dying). But otherwise-eligible patients with neuromuscular disabilities (ALS and other illnesses) are excluded if they are physically unable to “self-administer” the medications without assistance. This exclusion is incompatible with disability rights laws that mandate assistance to provide equal access to health care. This contradiction between aid-in-dying laws and disability rights laws can force patients and clinicians into violating (...) one or the other, potentially creating an underclass of patients denied medical care that is available to those with other (less physically disabling) terminal illnesses. The immediacy of this issue is demonstrated by a lawsuit in Federal court filed in August 2021, requesting assistance in self-administration for terminally ill patients with neuromuscular diseases. This paper discusses the background of this conflict, the ethical issues at the heart of the dilemma, and recommends potential remedies. (shrink)