The goal of this paper is to defend open theism vis-à-vis its main competitors within the family of broadly classical theisms, namely, theological determinism and the various forms of non-open free-will theism, such as Molinism and Ockhamism. After isolating two core theses over which open theists and their opponents differ, I argue for the open theist position on both points. Specifically, I argue against theological determinists that there are future contingents. And I argue against non-open free-will theists that future contingency (...) is incompatible with the future’s being epistemically settled for God. This paper is a follow-up to the author’s Rhoda (Religious Studies, 2008) which was delivered during the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God. (shrink)

This article attempts to spell out more clearly the Thomist, the Openist, and the Molinist approaches to divine providence, and to indicate the strengths and weaknesses of these three positions. It begins by discussing both the traditional notion of divine providence and the libertarian picture of freedom. The article then argues that each theory of divine providence has its advantages and disadvantages. Each has had numerous able and creative defenders. As with most philosophical disputes, one can hardly expect this debate (...) to come to an end. The field of battle may shift more clearly in the coming years to considerations of which view, when applied to specific doctrines, offers us the most satisfying overall position. Still, it seems quite likely that all three positions will continue to be defended for the foreseeable future. (shrink)

Harry Frankfurt's well-known counterexample to the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) has recently come under attack by those who argue that the success of that sort of counterexample depends on the falsity of incompatibilism. In response, I argue that, given one controversial assumption, there are Frankfurt-style counterexamples to PAP that don't take the falsity of incompatibilism for granted. The controversial assumption is the Molinist one that something like middle knowledge is possible. I then show how the falsity of PAP causes (...) some trouble for the Free Will Defense standardly offered in response to atheistic arguments from evil. (shrink)

Some contemporary theologians dismiss the classical discussions of the existence and nature of God as out of step with and unworthy of serious consideration by so-called "modern man." Others contend that even though the historical giants of philosophical theology generally had an intimate acquaintance with Sacred Scripture, their philosophical biases beguiled them unwittingly into forming conceptions of God that are wholly foreign to as well as incompatible with the biblical conception of God. These two distinct lines of criticism sometimes converge (...) in the suggestion that today's philosophical theologians should forsake their old heroes for duly modern ones like Whitehead, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein, whose writings allegedly provide philosophical outlooks more in tune with biblical categories of thought. Just as often, however, we find an attitude of distrust toward any sort of metaphysical reflection on the ostensible theological claims of the Judaeo-Christian tradition--both on the part of those who believe that the Judaeo-Christian myths have at most only ethical and perhaps political significance and on the part of those who believe that metaphysical inquiry invariably distorts theological truths by displacing Sacred Scripture as the foundation of the life of faith. Despite their disagreements, however, all sides concur in assigning little if any systematic importance to traditional philosophical theology. (shrink)

Article on the problem of free will and determinism. A defense of the so-called "consequence argument" arguing that free will and determinism are incompatible.

While the French Jesuits were scandalized at God's moral necessity to elect the best, Des Bosses was right in defending the Théodicée drawing the attention to the contemporary Spanish theology. In fact, Optimism is not the invention of Leibniz', but of the two Sevillan Jesuits' Diego Ruiz de Montoya and Diego Granado . It will be argued that Optimism has two roots, both of them closely connected with the Posttridentinian Theology: 1) the moralization of modal categories, 2) a universe integrating (...) Nature, Grace and Incarnation. In the latter regard, Optimism is a legitimate child of Molinism, viz. in respect to the ,scientia media‘ being the basis of its concept of World, to the ,total decree‘ as a certain mode of this world being realized. As a result, the Théodicée depends on Jesuit theology to an extent which still has to be acknowledged. (shrink)