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  1. Perceiving that we perceive: On the soul III,.L. A. Kosman - 1975 - Philosophical Review 84 (4):499-519.
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  • Aristote voit du rouge et entend un « do » : Combien se passe-t-il de choses ? Remarques sur « de Anima », II, 7-8.Myles Burnyeat - 1993 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 183 (2):263 - 280.
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  • Aristotle. [REVIEW]Deborah K. W. Modrak - 1988 - Review of Metaphysics 42 (2):395-396.
    Intended as an introduction to Aristotle's philosophy, this book succeeds in presenting and defending a unified conception of Aristotle's philosophy while at the same time making the discussion accessible to the student approaching the Aristotelian corpus for the first time. Taking Aristotle's mention of a distinctively human desire to understand as the starting point, Lear tackles the analysis of this desire from two perspectives--that of the object of understanding and that of the subject. The first perspective leads to the study (...)
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  • Aristotle and perceptual realism.Herbert Granger - 1993 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (S1):161-171.
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  • (2 other versions)Idealism and greek philosophy: What Descartes saw and Berkeley missed.M. F. Burnyeat - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (1):3-40.
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  • (1 other version)Changing Aristotle's Mind.Hilary Putnam & Martha C. Nussbaum - 1992 - In Martha C. Nussbaum & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Essays on Aristotle's de Anima. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
    This essay is a response to Myles Burnyeat’s paper that attacks an interpretation of the credibility and acceptability of Aristotle’s views of the body and soul. It begins with a discussion of Aristotle’s motivating problems. An interpretation is defended against Burnyeat, which distinguishes Aristotle from both materialist reductionism, and from the Burnyeat interpretation that perceiving etc. does not require concomitant material change, and that awareness is primitive. Aristotle’s position is then defended as tenable, even in the context of a modern (...)
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  • (1 other version)Intentionality and Physiological Processes: Aristotle's Theory of Sense‐Perception.Richard Sorabji - 1992 - In Martha C. Nussbaum & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Essays on Aristotle's de Anima. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
    Aristotle did not view perception as a rudimentary reaction with little content as suggested by Plato, nor as the work of reason and thought as claimed by Strato. Perception is a half-way house between the two. This essay explores Aristotle’s redrawing of the map in which perception is located, and the formal and material causes of perception.
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