rally best suited’. One would ordinarily suppose social justice to concern not only the allocation of duties but also the distribution of benefits. I argue that this expectation is fulfilled not by Plato’s conception of social justice, but by the normative basis for it, Plato’s requirement of aiming at the happiness of all the citizens. I argue that Plato treats social justice as a necessary but not sufficient means to happiness that guarantees only the production of the greatest goods; ensuring (...) that these goods are distributed so as to maximize the happiness of the whole city.. (shrink)

This essay seeks to question a certain imbalance in many existing accounts of Plato's dialogues. This imbalance involves a tendency to place too much emphasis upon a dualism between matter and spirit, soul and body. Although the author by no means denies the presence of such dualistic elements, she wishes to qualify them with reference to those aspects of Plato's dialogues which appear to place a stress upon the importance of multiplicity, myth, ritual, society, history, mimesis and time. Such instances (...) of mediation, it will be argued, are just as central to an understanding of Plato's philosophy as instances where the body and/or instances of multiplicity appear to be deprioritised in favour of the soul and the unity of the intelligible realm. These issues will be explored with particular reference to Plato's examination of the nature of justice in the city and its relationship with the philosopher‐guardians exercise of phronesis. What is the relationship between dikaiosyne and phronesis? In order to answer this question, several further questions will be raised: What, for Plato, is a city? What is philosophy? And why, in the Laws, does the Athenian describe the city as “the true tragedy”? (shrink)

I link together the nuptial number, that ‘whole geometric number', represented as the areas of two distinct figures -- a square and a rectangle -- with the ‘triangles in ascending order'. I locate an indeterminancy in the conditions for the production of the ‘divine creature', which I take to be a philosopher , and suggest a new interpretation of the breakdown of the eugenics programme. I try to show how and why that breakdown is metaphysically necessary. I argue that Plato (...) uses mathematical indeterminancy not only to suggest that the decline is necessary, but also to issue an epistemic warning to us, to the effect that we should avoid trying to come to a philosophical understanding of forms by focusing on even very fine particulars. (shrink)