We cannot directly perceive and experience objects of words such as “ apūrva ” “ devatā ,” and “ svarga ,” while objects of words such as “cow” and “horse” are perceptible. Therefore in the Indian linguistic context, some assert that there are two categories of words. However, a grammarian philosopher Bhartṛhari (450 CE) in the second book of his Vākyapadīya , introduces a verse stating that there is no difference between them. Other Indian thinkers as well deal with this (...) issue in various contexts. This paper aims at exploring the ideas expressed in Bhartṛhari’s verse and the related arguments found in other treatises of different schools. It consists of discussions of the followingt: (1) Bhartṛhari’s Vākyapadīya 2.119 and its commentarial texts; (2) Kumārila’s Criticism; (3) The Nyāya context; (4) The Sāṃkhya and the Buddhist context; (5) Related grammatical passages and the background of the Vākyapadīya 2.119; and (6) Conclusion. (shrink)

Aim of the lectures -- Early Brahmanical literature -- Panini's grammar -- A passage from the Chandogya Upanisad -- The structures of languages -- The Buddhist contribution -- Vaisesika and language -- Verbal knowledge -- The contradictions of Nagarjuna -- The reactions of other thinkers -- Sarvastivada Samkhya -- The Agamasastra of Gaudapada -- Sankara -- Kashmiri Saivism -- Jainism -- Early Vaisesika -- Critiques of the existence of a thing before its arising -- Nyaya -- Mimamsa -- The Abhidharmakosa (...) bhasya of Vasubandhu -- The Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asanga and its bhasya -- Bhartrhari -- The problem of negation -- Dignaga and verbal knowledge -- The Bodhisattvabhumi -- Prajnakaragupta -- Indian thinkers and the correspondence principle -- Appendix. The Mahaprajnaparamitasastra and the Samkhya tanmatras. (shrink)

It is a remarkable feature of language, and of human understanding, that the same word refers to various individual objects. This is most evident in the case of generic terms . For example, the word 'tree' may apply to one tree in one instance and another in another instance. Because the word applies to different individuals in each case, yet the same cognition "x is a tree" is present, the question arises, "of what object does the word convey knowledge?" In (...) studying their discussions on this topic, the present dissertation translates Patanjali on Panini 1.2.58 and 1.2.64, Vatsyayana on Gautama 2.2.58-69, and Sabara on the Akrtyadhikarana. ;Patanjali considers the merits, difficulties, and philosophical presuppositions of the extreme views that a word denotes just an individual and that it denotes just a generic property. If a word naturally denotes whatever individual objects it refers to, one cannot account for the occurrence of the same cognition regarding each. The same cognition regarding each of many individuals of a kind is explained as based on a generic property present in each. But if a generic term denotes as a single generic property, one cannot account for linguistic usages reflecting the comprehension of distinction in number, differences in quality, or participation in action, all of which naturally belong to individuals. Because the same cognition and knowledge of distinction, etc. are both present when a generic term is used, Patanjali concludes that the word denotes both the generic property and an individual. In Nyaya, Gautama, as explained by Vatsyayana, favors this solution too. He includes shape as a third element denoted because it is a means to infer the generic property. Sabara affirms that a generic property alone is denoted, demonstrates that cognition of a generic property must derive directly from the word, and explains how cognition of an individual derives from cognition of the generic property. Though his explanation is feasible, his proofs that an individual is not also denoted, depending on a doubtful example and biased application of presumption, are vulnerable. (shrink)