Robert Gibbs radically revises standard interpretations of the two key figures of modern Jewish philosophy--Franz Rosenzweig, author of the monumental Star of Redemption, and Emmanuel Levinas, a major voice in contemporary intellectual life, who has inspired such thinkers as Derrida, Lyotard, Irigaray, and Blanchot. Rosenzweig and Levinas thought in relation to different philosophical schools and wrote in disparate styles. Their personal relations to Judaism and Christianity were markedly dissimilar. To Gibbs, however, the two thinkers possess basic affinities with each other. (...) The book offers important insights into how philosophy is continually being altered by its encounter with other traditions. (shrink)

Ranging over philosophy, literary theory, social theory, and historiography, this is an ambitious and provocative work that holds profound lessons for how we think about ethics and how we seek to live responsibly.

This long-awaited book sets out the implications of Habermas's theory of communicative action for moral theory. "Discourse ethics" attempts to reconstruct a moral point of view from which normative claims can be impartially judged. The theory of justice it develops replaces Kant's categorical imperative with a procedure of justification based on reasoned agreement among participants in practical discourse.Habermas connects communicative ethics to the theory of social action via an examination of research in the social psychology of moral and interpersonal development. (...) He aims to show that our basic moral intuitions spring from something deeper and more universal than contingent features of our tradition, namely from normative presuppositions of social interaction that belong to the repertoire of competent agents in any society. Jürgen Habermas is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Frankfurt. (shrink)

Challenges the accepted model, and builds a politically sensitive notion of generosity.

Although the continental philosophers Jürgen Habermas and Emmanuel Levinas are both inescapably important to an array of debates in contemporary moral theory, they are rarely assessed in relation to each other. Not only are their basic agendas different—whereas Habermas's discourse ethics are framed within a general concern for democratic political theory, Levinas's work is largely indifferent, if not hostile, to political concerns—but their philosophical styles dramatically contrast as well. Steven Hendley's study is based on the conviction that beneath the surface (...) there is in fact a remarkable degree of convergence in the two philosophers' work that is usually overlooked. Hendley discovers and explains the complementarity of Levinas's conception of discourse as relation to the Other to Habermas's theory of communication as the basis for recognition of universal moral norms; and he presents a clear defense and validation of Levinas's position on the construction of political theory. From Communicative Action to the Face of the Other is a unique endeavor that achieves new and important connections in the contemporary scholarship in philosophy and political theory. (shrink)

For Habermas, a moral point of view is based in the procedural requirements of our linguistic competence. For Levinas, it is the way in which we find ourselves related in speech to the face of the other that we find ourselves obliged to the other. But these differing conceptions of the moral significance of language need not be seen as opposed to each other. Rather, they can be conceptualized as complimentary accounts of the ways in which a moral point of (...) view onto life is inextricably bound up for us with our capacities as linguistic creatures. While Habermas enables us to see the importance of language as a rule-governed social practice for the constitution of a moral point of view, Levinas draws our attention to the way in which the moral significance of language so conceived lies in a form of sensibility, a sensible “exposure” or “vulnerability” to the other person, older than language itself. Appropriately coordinated, these two perspectives give us a more adequate understanding than either can on its own of the central place of language in our lives as moral agents. (shrink)

Altered Reading will interest philosophers, literary critics, scholars of religion, and others drawn to Levinas's work.

Emmanuel Levinas has written one of the most original philosophies of our times, and we have the responsibility to read it, in the perspective of a real interpretation. That comprehension or embracing of the texts manifests the philosophical respect for the major work (see Sophist, 242a). From this point of view, we try to show the 'pragmatic' structure of the ethical relationship, 'the grammar of the Other' exposed by a fundamental ethics structured as a language The immanent reading of Levinas' (...) texts opens to many other (already classical) interpretations and new perspectives of understanding and application. (shrink)

My title echoes Levinas' 1951 “Is ontology fundamental?” – a seminal piece that paved the way for his justly famous Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being. I suggest that the characteristically enthusiastic, uncritical reception of these works may not be due primarily to their originality and sheer intellectual brilliance, but rather to something in Levinas' position that deeply resonates with the spirit of our times and our preoccupation with the fate of “the Other.” My claim, however, is that accepting (...) a Levinassian ethics, in which the Other has priority over the self, comes at too high a price, for it implies definitions of otherness and selfhood that fail to address precisely the problems that prompted preoccupation with otherness in the first place. I suggest that our struggles with racism, sexism, cultural bias point to frictions in (inter-)subjectivity that are inappropriately ethicized when treated, ala Levinas, simply as examples of an unwillingness to open up to the Other. In Levinas' universe, it is impossible not to hear the Other's appeal, but I argue that this view ignores the existence of a dimension of selfhood that cannot be absorbed into intersubjectivity. A metaphysical loneliness is thus implied here that our age seems unwilling to bear, preferring to cover it up with an ethics that makes us always responsible – that is, in response, connected to the Other. I develop this criticism by analyzing what I call a non-privative notion of irresponsibility whose roots are neither ethical nor ontological. (shrink)

La pensée de Lévinas demande à être prise au sérieux, aventure philosophique où le verset ne vaut pas preuve, et qui a toujours gardé sa route comme un marin, son cap. Aujourd'hui que l'œuvre est close, il est clair que cette navigation n'allait vers aucun port mais que, par essence hauturière, elle cingla droit, là où les mers étaient vastes et les vents, forts. Là, une haute vague se leva : Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence. Ce titre, où un (...) adverbe pointe démesurément au-delà du verbe, dresse le livre au-delà de son propre contexte. Mais il permet de rassembler toute l'œuvre dans le sillage de sa course, et donne une vue sur la philosophie du siècle, et celle qui nous fut transmise. Prendre cette pensée au sérieux, c'est d'abord faire le pari de la neutralité, ne pas y chercher une morale mais l'accompagner dans sa quête du sens éthique comme intelligibilité ultime de l'humain et possibilité de la compréhension de l'être. Adjectif substantivé (au neutre, das Ethische) avant que substantif (die Ethik), l'éthique se formule en se cristallisant autour de certains vocables (Je, Tu, Il, Es - sujet, autrui, Dieu, être) qu'elle compose, comme un poème ou, mieux, une partition. Accompagner cette pensée, c'est seulement dérouler l'intrigue que tissent - " Ensemble, mais pas encore " - ces mots obéissant à leur loi. C'est dire le sonnet ou interpréter la sonate. On suit alors le mouvement an-archique d'une pensée qui, au profond du sujet, discerne une brûlure, nécessaire pour qu'autrui ne soit pas loup pour un loup. Ce ravage, seule la grâce improbable d'un Dieu qui s'absente s'offre à le réparer, concédant ainsi à l'homme d'être. J. R. (shrink)