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  1. Foundations of Social Theory.James Samuel Coleman - 1990 - Belknap Press.
    Combining principles of individual rational choice with a sociological conception of collective action, James Coleman recasts social theory in a bold new way. The result is a landmark in sociological theory, capable of describing both stability and change in social systems. This book provides for the first time a sound theoretical foundation for linking the behavior of individuals to organizational behavior and then to society as a whole. The power of the theory is especially apparent when Coleman analyzes corporate actors, (...)
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  • Trust as a Commodity.Partha Dasgupta - 1988 - In Diego Gambetta (ed.), Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations. Blackwell. pp. 49-72.
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  • The Evolution of Cooperation.Robert M. Axelrod - 1984 - Basic Books.
    The 'Evolution of Cooperation' addresses a simple yet age-old question; If living things evolve through competition, how can cooperation ever emerge? Despite the abundant evidence of cooperation all around us, there existed no purely naturalistic answer to this question until 1979, when Robert Axelrod famously ran a computer tournament featuring a standard game-theory exercise called The Prisoner's Dilemma. To everyone's surprise, the program that won the tournament, named Tit for Tat, was not only the simplest but the most "cooperative" entrant. (...)
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  • Game Theory and the Social Contract.Ken Binmore - 1994 - MIT Press.
    Binmore argues that game theory provides a systematic tool for investigating ethical matters.
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  • Trust, Reputation, and Exit in Exchange Relationships.Bernd Lahno - 1995 - Journal of Conflict Resolution 39 (3):495-510.
    Unlike the supergame model assumes agents in exchange situations will normally not be perfectly informed on past behaviour of their partners. Also, they will be able to choose their partners to a certain extend. A formal model is presented that attempts to take account of these facts. It is supposed that for any actor the probability of finding a partner for a lucrative exchange depends on his past behaviour. A model of reputation formation is presented as a formal description of (...)
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