This paper reports laboratory data for games that are played only once. These games span the standard categories: static and dynamic games with complete and incomplete information. For each game, the treasure is a treatment in which behavior conforms nicely to predictions of the Nash equilibrium or relevant refinement. In each case, however, a change in the payoff structure produces a large inconsistency between theoretical predictions and observed behavior. These contradictions are generally consistent with simple intuition based on the interaction (...) of payoff asymmetries and noisy introspection about others’ decisions. (shrink)

Many weaknesses of game theory are cured by new models that embody simple cognitive principles, while maintaining the formalism and generality that makes game theory useful. Social preference models can generate team reasoning by combining reciprocation and correlated equilibrium. Models of limited iterated thinking explain data better than equilibrium models do; and they self-repair problems of implausibility and multiplicity of equilibria.

The hypothesis, that injunctive and descriptive norms interact positively or synergistically to promote cooperation in social dilemmas, is tested in the context of a survey study focusing on environmentally responsible behaviour. Measurement error and strong and positive correlations between the two types of normative beliefs make it difficult to test the interaction hypothesis. By using structural equation modelling with residual centering, these problems are overcome and the interaction hypothesis is confirmed. The result is stable across three replications spanning a two-year (...) period. (shrink)

Suggests a biological basis for the social organization and cooperation shown by the human race, and traces the evolution of society.