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Deep Disagreement in a Multicultural World

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Investigating the Shared Background Required for Argument: A Critique of Fogelin’s Thesis on Deep Disagreement.Dana Phillips - 2008 - Informal Logic 28 (2):86-101.details Robert Fogelin claims that interlocutors must share a framework of background beliefs and commitments in order to fruitfully pursue argument. I refute Fogelin’s claim by investigating more thoroughly the shared background required for productive argument. I find that this background consists not in any common beliefs regarding the topic at hand, but rather in certain shared pro-cedural commitments and competencies. I suggest that Fogelin and his supporters mistakenly view shared beliefs as part of the required background for productive argument because (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 14 citations
(1 other version)The logic of deep disagreements.Robert Fogelin - 1985 - Informal Logic 7 (1):3-11.details Download Export citation Bookmark 156 citations
Revisiting deep disagreement.Dale Turner & Larry Wright - 2005 - Informal Logic 25 (1):25-35.details Argument-giving reasons for a view-is our model of rational dispute resolution. Fogelin suggests that certain "deep" disagreements cannot be resolved in this way because features of their context "undercut the conditions essential to arguing" . In this paper we add some detail to Fogelin's treatment of intractable disagreements. In doing so we distinguish between his relatively modest claim that some disputes cannot be resolved through argument and his more radical claim that such disputes are beyond rational resolution. This distinction, along (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 30 citations
(1 other version)The Logic of Deep Disagreements.Robert Fogelin - 2005 - Informal Logic 25 (1):3-11.details Download Export citation Bookmark 129 citations
Treacherous Ascents: On Seeking Common Ground for Conflict Resolution.Christian Campolo - 2005 - Informal Logic 25 (1):37-50.details The judgment competent reasoners exhibit in deciding when reasoning should not be used to resolve disagreements is eroded by adopting the popular strategy of ascending to higher levels of generality. That strategy encourages disputants to believeoften incorrectly-that they stand on some common ground that can be exploited to reach agreement. But if we regularly assume that we share values and interests with our opponents in seemingly intractable disputes, we risk losing the ability to judge whether or not we share enough. (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 25 citations

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