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  1. Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations.Jesse Graham, Jonathan Haidt & Brian A. Nosek - 2009 - Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 96 (5):1029-1046.
    How and why do moral judgments vary across the political spectrum? To test moral foundations theory, the authors developed several ways to measure people’s use of 5 sets of moral intuitions: Harm/care, Fairness/reciprocity, Ingroup/loyalty, Authority/respect, and Purity/sanctity. Across 4 studies using multiple methods, liberals consistently showed greater endorsement and use of the Harm/care and Fairness/reciprocity foundations compared to the other 3 foundations, whereas conservatives endorsed and used the 5 foundations more equally. This difference was observed in abstract assessments of the (...)
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  • A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality.Daniel Kahneman - 2003 - American Psychologist 58 (9):697.
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  • Sidetracked by trolleys: Why sacrificial moral dilemmas tell us little (or nothing) about utilitarian judgment.Guy Kahane - 2015 - Social Neuroscience 10 (5):551-560.
    Research into moral decision-making has been dominated by sacrificial dilemmas where, in order to save several lives, it is necessary to sacrifice the life of another person. It is widely assumed that these dilemmas draw a sharp contrast between utilitarian and deontological approaches to morality, and thereby enable us to study the psychological and neural basis of utilitarian judgment. However, it has been previously shown that some sacrificial dilemmas fail to present a genuine contrast between utilitarian and deontological options. Here, (...)
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  • The rise of moral cognition.Joshua D. Greene - 2015 - Cognition 135 (C):39-42.
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  • ‘Utilitarian’ judgments in sacrificial moral dilemmas do not reflect impartial concern for the greater good.Guy Kahane, Jim A. C. Everett, Brian D. Earp, Miguel Farias & Julian Savulescu - 2015 - Cognition 134 (C):193-209.
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  • The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment.Jonathan Haidt - 2001 - Psychological Review 108 (4):814-834.
    Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done (...)
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  • Patterns of Moral Judgment Derive From Nonmoral Psychological Representations.Fiery Cushman & Liane Young - 2011 - Cognitive Science 35 (6):1052-1075.
    Ordinary people often make moral judgments that are consistent with philosophical principles and legal distinctions. For example, they judge killing as worse than letting die, and harm caused as a necessary means to a greater good as worse than harm caused as a side-effect (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006). Are these patterns of judgment produced by mechanisms specific to the moral domain, or do they derive from other psychological domains? We show that the action/omission and means/side-effect distinctions affect nonmoral representations (...)
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  • Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test.Debbie E. McGhee, Jordan L. K. Schwartz & Anthony G. Greenwald - 1998 - Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74 (6):1464-1480.
    An implicit association test (IAT) measures differential association of 2 target concepts with an attribute. The 2 concepts appear in a 2-choice task (e.g., flower vs. insect names), and the attribute in a 2nd task (e.g., pleasant vs. unpleasant words for an evaluation attribute). When instructions oblige highly associated categories (e.g., flower + pleasant) to share a response key, performance is faster than when less associated categories (e.g., insect + pleasant) share a key. This performance difference implicitly measures differential association (...)
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  • Intuitive and deliberate judgments are based on common principles.Arie W. Kruglanski & Gerd Gigerenzer - 2011 - Psychological Review 118 (1):97-109.
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  • The Neural Basis of Error Detection: Conflict Monitoring and the Error-Related Negativity.Nick Yeung, Matthew M. Botvinick & Jonathan D. Cohen - 2004 - Psychological Review 111 (4):931-959.
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  • The mismeasure of morals: Antisocial personality traits predict utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas.Daniel M. Bartels & David A. Pizarro - 2011 - Cognition 121 (1):154-161.
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  • On the (un-) controllability of affective priming: Strategic manipulation is feasible but can possibly be prevented.Juliane Degner - 2009 - Cognition and Emotion 23 (2):327-354.
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  • Two Minds Vs. Two Philosophies: Mind Perception Defines Morality and Dissolves the Debate Between Deontology and Utilitarianism. [REVIEW]Kurt Gray & Chelsea Schein - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (3):405-423.
    Mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. Broadly, moral standing is linked to perceptions of mind, with moral responsibility tied to perceived agency, and moral rights tied to perceived experience. More specifically, moral judgments are based on a fundamental template of two perceived minds—an intentional agent and a suffering patient. This dyadic template grows out of the universal power of harm, and serves as a cognitive working model through which even atypical moral events are understood. Thus, all instances of (...)
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  • The neural basis of human error processing: Reinforcement learning, dopamine, and the error-related negativity.Clay B. Holroyd & Michael G. H. Coles - 2002 - Psychological Review 109 (4):679-709.
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  • Immediate affect as a basis for intuitive moral judgement: An adaptation of the affect misattribution procedure.Wilhelm Hofmann & Anna Baumert - 2010 - Cognition and Emotion 24 (3):522-535.
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  • A process dissociation framework: Separating automatic from intentional uses of memory.Larry L. Jacoby - 1991 - Journal of Memory and Language 30:513-41.
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  • Multinomial modeling and the measurement of cognitive processes.David M. Riefer & William H. Batchelder - 1988 - Psychological Review 95 (3):318-339.
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