This paper concentrates on some aspects of the history of the analytic-synthetic distinction from Kant to Bolzano and Frege. This history evinces considerable continuity but also some important discontinuities. The analytic-synthetic distinction has to be seen in the first place in relation to a science, i.e. an ordered system of cognition. Looking especially to the place and role of logic it will be argued that Kant, Bolzano and Frege each developed the analytic-synthetic distinction within the same conception of scientific rationality, (...) that is, within the Classical Model of Science: scientific knowledge as cognitio ex principiis . But as we will see, the way the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments or propositions functions within this model turns out to differ considerably between them. (shrink)

In einem Brief an Christiaan Huygens aus dem Jahre 1679 schlägt Leibniz eine neue von der Cartesischen Algebra verschiedene Characteristica geometrica vor. Dieser Entwurf wurde von einigen Wissenschaftshistorikern als ein Vorläufer der Analysis situs oder Topologie betrachtet. Im Jahre 1846 erhielt Graßmann einen Preis, der ausgesetzt worden war für die Konstruktion eines geometrischen Kalküls, der dem Leibnizschen ähnlich sein sollte. Im folgenden kritisierte ich die heute gemeinhin vertretene Auffassung, die Geometnsche Analyse von Graßmann sei die legitime mathematische Weiterentwicklung der geometrischen (...) Konzeptionen von Leibniz. Zunächst breite ich einige wenig bekannte historische Fakten bezüglich Leibniz und Graßmann aus und dann gehe ich dazu über, Kritik an Graßmanns Lektüre des Leibnizschen Textes zu üben. Die Frage nach dem wissenschaftlichen Wert der Gedanken, die Leibniz Huygens gegenüber äußert, möchte ich jedoch bis zur bald zu erwartenden Publikation zahlreicher Leibniz-Texte zu diesem Thema offen lassen. (shrink)

Throughout more than two millennia philosophers adhered massively to ideal standards of scientific rationality going back ultimately to Aristotle’s Analytica posteriora . These standards got progressively shaped by and adapted to new scientific needs and tendencies. Nevertheless, a core of conditions capturing the fundamentals of what a proper science should look like remained remarkably constant all along. Call this cluster of conditions the Classical Model of Science . In this paper we will do two things. First of all, we will (...) propose a general and systematized account of the Classical Model of Science. Secondly, we will offer an analysis of the philosophical significance of this model at different historical junctures by giving an overview of the connections it has had with a number of important topics. The latter include the analytic-synthetic distinction, the axiomatic method, the hierarchical order of sciences and the status of logic as a science. Our claim is that particularly fruitful insights are gained by seeing themes such as these against the background of the Classical Model of Science. In an appendix we deal with the historiographical background of this model by considering the systematizations of Aristotle’s theory of science offered by Heinrich Scholz, and in his footsteps by Evert W. Beth. (shrink)

This paper concentrates on some aspects of the history of the analyticsynthetic distinction from Kant to Bolzano and Frege. This history evinces considerable continuity but also some important discontinuities. The analytic-synthetic distinction has to be seen in the first place in relation to a science, i.e. an ordered system of cognition. Looking especially to the place and role of logic it will be argued that Kant, Bolzano and Frege each developed the analytic-synthetic distinction within the same conception of scientific rationality, (...) that is, within the Classical Model of Science: scientific knowledge as cognitio exprincipiis. But as we will see, the way the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments or propositions functions within this model turns out to differ considerably between them. (shrink)

Throughout more than two millennia philosophers adhered massively to ideal standards of scientific rationality going back ultimately to Aristotle’s Analytica posteriora. These standards got progressively shaped by and adapted to new scientific needs and tendencies. Nevertheless, a core of conditions capturing the fundamentals of what a proper science should look like remained remarkably constant all along. Call this cluster of conditions the Classical Model of Science. In this paper we will do two things. First of all, we will propose a (...) general and systematized account of the Classical Model of Science. Secondly, we will offer an analysis of the philosophical significance of this model at different historical junctures by giving an overview of the connections it has had with a number of important topics. The latter include the analytic-synthetic distinction, the axiomatic method, the hierarchical order of sciences and the status of logic as a science. Our claim is that particularly fruitful insights are gained by seeing themes such as these against the background of the Classical Model of Science. In an appendix we deal with the historiographical background of this model by considering the systematizations of Aristotle’s theory of science offered by Heinrich Scholz, and in his footsteps by Evert W. Beth. (shrink)

Dans l’article suivant on montre le développement des idées géométriques fondamentales de Leibniz jusqu'au „calculus situs”. En outre on en expose la connexion avec la géométrie euclidienne et cartésienne, et en particulier avec la métaphysique leibnizienne. L'analyse mathématique démontre la nature du „calculus situs”, à l'occasion de laquelle la critique de Graßmann est analysée. Il est possible de transformer les idées leibniziennes dans un formalisme mathématique moderne, c'est à dire dans un formalisme propre à la recherche de la structure des (...) relations. Il en résulté que l'expression „calcul” est difficilement justifiable, et une géométrie nouvelle n'en n'est pas dérivée. Leibniz lui-même n'était pas toujours satisfait de son „calculus situs”, et il n'est pas du tout certain qu'il ait trouvé une conception satisfaisante. (shrink)