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On being false by self-refutation

Metaphilosophy 23 (4):410-426 (1992)

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  1. Concepts of Relative Truth.Jack W. Meiland - 1977 - The Monist 60 (4):568-582.
    It is sometimes said that our age is an age of relativism. For example, Paul Tillich has expressed his “uneasiness about the victory of relativism in all realms of thought and life today.” Karl Popper tells us that “the main philosophical malady of our time is an intellectual and moral relativism, the latter being at least in part based on the former.” What Popper refers to as “intellectual relativism” consists in part in a doctrine about truth which is sometimes expressed (...)
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  • Self-refuting arguments.Michael Stack - 1983 - Metaphilosophy 14 (3-4):327-335.
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  • Self-reference and meaning in ordinary language.Karl R. Popper - 1954 - Mind 63 (250):162-169.
    This article is a modern socratic dialogue between socrates and theaetetus presented in the "ordinary language." the discussion centers on self-Referring statements and their meaning. (staff).
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  • (1 other version)Self-refutation—a formal analysis.J. Mackie - 1964 - Philosophical Quarterly 14 (56):193-203.
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  • (1 other version)Self-reference in philosophy.Frederic B. Fitch - 1946 - Mind 55 (217):64-73.
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  • Self-refuting propositions and relativism.F. C. White - 1989 - Metaphilosophy 20 (1):84–92.
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  • Some reflections on reflexivity.Jørgen Jørgensen - 1953 - Mind 62 (247):289-300.
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  • (1 other version)Self-referential inconsistency, inevitable falsity and metaphysical argumentation.Joseph M. Boyle Jr - 1972 - Metaphilosophy 3 (1):25-42.
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  • (1 other version)Self‐Referential Inconsistency, Inevitable Falsity and Metaphysical Argumentation.Joseph M. Boyle Jr - 1972 - Metaphilosophy 3 (1):25-42.
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