The highly publicized deaths of research participants Ellen Roche and Jesse Gelsinger are stark reminders that risk is inherent in medical research and while untoward outcomes are infrequent when compared to individual and societal benefits, injury and even death will happen. Who is responsible for the welfare of research subjects and what are they owed? Why were they put at risk to begin with? Are obligations, if any, to research subjects dependent on the type of study in which they participate, (...) in recognition that there may be personal benefit from participation in some studies?The issue of injury resulting from participation in research and answers to questions such as those just posed were last considered in depth nearly 20 years ago by the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research. (shrink)

While risk of harm is an important focus for whether clinical research on humans can and should proceed, there is uncertainty about what constitutes harm to a trial participant. In Phase I trials on healthy volunteers, the purpose of the research is to document and measure safety concerns associated with investigational drugs, and participants are financially compensated for their enrollment in these studies. In this article, we investigate how characterizations of harm are narrated by healthy volunteers in the context of (...) the adverse events they experience during clinical trials. Drawing upon qualitative research, we find that participants largely minimize, deny, or re-attribute the cause of these AEs. We illustrate how participants' interpretations of AEs may be shaped both by the clinical trial environment and their economic motivation to participate. While these narratives are emblematic of the larger ambiguity surrounding harm in the context of clinical trial participation, we argue that these interpretations also problematically maintain the narrative of the safety of clinical trials, the ethics of testing investigational drugs on healthy people, and the rigor of data collected in the specter of such ambiguity. (shrink)

Lowering compensation to research subjects to protect them from “undue inducement” is a misguided attempt to shoehorn a concern about exploitation into the framework of autonomy. We suggest that oversight bodies should be less concerned about undue influence than about exploitation of subjects. Avoiding exploitation in human subjects research requires not only increasing compensation, but enhancing the dignity of research participation.

Compensation for research-related injuries (RRIs) remains a challenge in the current environment of global collaborative biomedical research as exemplified by the continued reluctance of the US government, a major player in international biomedical research, to enact regulation for mandatory compensation for RRIs. This stance is in stark contrast to the mandatory compensation policies adopted by other democracies like the European Union (EU) countries. These positions taken by the USA and the EU create a nexus of confusion when research is exported (...) to low-income and middle-income countries which have no laws guiding compensation for RRIs. In this paper, we begin by exploring the background to policies concerning RRIs, how they reflect on the traditional dispute resolution mechanisms in African societies, and how this compares with the no-fault compensation model. We then explore the underlying African ethical framework of Ubuntu in the sub-Saharan region, guiding traditional practices of dispute resolution and compensation, and how this framework can help to form the moral justification for no-fault compensation as the preferred compensation model for RRIs for African countries. Finally, we call upon countries in the African Union (AU), to adopt a no-fault policy for compensation of RRIs, and enact it into a regulatory requirement for insurance-based no-fault compensation for biomedical research, which will then be enforced by member states of the AU. (shrink)

The federal regulations that govern biomedical research, most notably those enshrined in the Common Rule, express a protectionist ethos aimed at safeguarding subjects of human experimentation from the potential harms of research participation. In at least one critical way, however, the regulations have always fallen short of this promise: if a subject suffers a research-related injury, then neither the investigator nor the sponsor has any legal obligation under the regulations to care for or compensate the subject. Because very few subjects (...) with research-related injuries can meet the financial or evidentiary requirements associated with a successful legal claim to recover the costs associated with their injuries, most injured subjects must shoulder the burden of those expenses alone. For 40 years, national advisory panels have concluded that this result is out of step with the Common Rule's otherwise protectionist promise. When the Department of Health and Human Services released an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) in 2011, suggesting potential changes to the Common Rule, the time seemed ripe to address research-related injuries. The ANPRM, however, makes no mention of compensation for research-related injuries, and the federal government once again seems poised to stop short of addressing what has arguably become the most longstanding, frequent, and consistent plea for regulatory reform of research: protections for injured subjects. This article asks why, despite decades of federal-level panels recommending no-fault compensation for research-related injuries, the United States has so strongly resisted change. I suggest that a central reason for our current impasse is that, despite consensus among federal advisory committees that there is an obligation to compensate injured subjects, the committees have not coalesced around a moral justification for that duty. Although multiple justifications can support and even strengthen a single ethical obligation, the reverse has occurred in this context. I demonstrate that the committees' articulation of multiple ethical principles – including humanitarianism, professional beneficence, and compensatory justice – results in incongruent obligations that favor different kinds of compensation systems. This outcome, which I call “moral gridlock,” makes it extremely difficult to determine what kind of compensation scheme to implement. Recognizing that each moral argument for compensation creates a slightly different trajectory is, however, an important first step in moving toward a more systematic approach to compensating injured research subjects. (shrink)

The federal regulations that govern biomedical research, most notably those enshrined in the Common Rule, are a product of their time. Born in the aftermath of wartime atrocities committed by Nazi doctors, and influenced by domestic research scandals like the Willowbrook and Tuskegee studies, the regulations express a protectionist ethos aimed at safeguarding subjects of human experimentation from the potential harms of research participation. Requirements for informed consent, risk minimization, equitable subject selection, and peer review of proposed research rest on (...) the presumption that the research enterprise owes subjects a duty of protection. (shrink)

Because research involving human subjects exposes people to risk not always for their own potential benefit, the question arises as to how best ensure that: research participants are protected and benefited according to the highest ethical standards, while, on the other hand, researchers are protected and free to do research that will produce clinical advances for both research participants and society as a whole.The balancing of the risk to research participants versus the benefits derived from the research is performed in (...) many counrries by a system for the protection of human research participants that is laid out in national laws and regulations. In the United States, this system is based on principles emanating from the Nuremberg Code, the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki,and the report of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. (shrink)

Because research involving human subjects exposes people to risk not always for their own potential benefit, the question arises as to how best ensure that: research participants are protected and benefited according to the highest ethical standards, while, on the other hand, researchers are protected and free to do research that will produce clinical advances for both research participants and society as a whole.The balancing of the risk to research participants versus the benefits derived from the research is performed in (...) many counrries by a system for the protection of human research participants that is laid out in national laws and regulations. In the United States, this system is based on principles emanating from the Nuremberg Code, the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki,and the report of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. (shrink)