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  1. (2 other versions)On being alienated.Michael G. F. Martin - 2006 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Disjunctivism about perceptual appearances, as I conceive of it, is a theory which seeks to preserve a naïve realist conception of veridical perception in the light of the challenge from the argument from hallucination. The naïve realist claims that some sensory experiences are relations to mind-independent objects. That is to say, taking experiences to be episodes or events, the naïve realist supposes that some such episodes have as constituents mind-independent objects. In turn, the disjunctivist claims that in a case of (...)
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  • What is structural realism?James Ladyman - 1998 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 29 (3):409-424.
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  • (1 other version)XI*—Perception, Vision and Causation.Paul Snowdon - 1981 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81 (1):175-192.
    Paul Snowdon; XI*—Perception, Vision and Causation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 1981, Pages 175–192, https://doi.org/10.
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  • Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism.David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (eds.) - 2008 - Bradford.
    Many philosophical naturalists eschew analysis in favor of discovering metaphysical truths from the a posteriori, contending that analysis does not lead to philosophical insight. A countercurrent to this approach seeks to reconcile a certain account of conceptual analysis with philosophical naturalism; prominent and influential proponents of this methodology include the late David Lewis, Frank Jackson, Michael Smith, Philip Pettit, and David Armstrong. Naturalistic analysis is a tool for locating in the scientifically given world objects and properties we quantify over in (...)
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  • (1 other version)Do relations require underlying intrinsic properties? A physical argument for a metaphysics of relations.Michael Esfeld - 2003 - Metaphysica: International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics 4 (1):5-25.
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  • The role of imagination in Kant's theory of experience.Wilfrid Sellars - 1978 - In Henry W. Pennsylvania & Johnstone (eds.), Categories a Colloquium [Held by the Philosophy Department of the Pennsylvania State University During the Academic Year 1977-78]. The University. pp. 231-245.
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  • (2 other versions)Ramseyan humility.David K. Lewis - 2008 - In David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. Bradford. pp. 203-222.
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  • Theories, perception and structural realism.Grover Maxwell - 1970 - In Robert G. Colodny (ed.), The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories: Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy. University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 3-34.
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  • Concepts without intuition lose the game: commentary on Montero and Evans (2011). [REVIEW]Fernand Gobet - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):237-250.
    In several papers, Hubert Dreyfus has used chess as a paradigmatic example of how experts act intuitively, rarely using deliberation when selecting actions, while individuals that are only competent rely on analytic and deliberative thought. By contrast, Montero and Evans (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10:175–194, 2011 ) argue that intuitive aspects of chess are actually rational, in the sense that actions can be justified. In this paper, I show that both Dreyfus’s and Montero and Evans’s views are too extreme, (...)
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  • (1 other version)Perception.Howard Robinson - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (188):382-384.
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  • Subject, Thought, and Context.Philip Pettit & John Mcdowell - 1987 - Mind 96 (384):588-591.
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  • Visualization, pattern recognition, and forward search: effects of playing speed and sight of the position on grandmaster chess errors.Christopher F. Chabris & Eliot S. Hearst - 2003 - Cognitive Science 27 (4):637-648.
    A new approach examined two aspects of chess skill, long a popular topic in cognitive science. A powerful computer‐chess program calculated the number and magnitude of blunders made by the same 23 grandmasters in hundreds of serious games of slow (“classical”) chess, regular “rapid” chess, and rapid “blindfold” chess, in which opponents transmit moves without ever seeing the actual position. Rapid chess led to substantially more and larger blunders than classical chess. Perhaps more surprisingly, the frequency and magnitude of blunders (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Analysis of Matter.E. H. Kennard & Bertrand Russell - 1928 - Philosophical Review 37 (4):382.
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  • In Defense of Relational Direct Realism.Kenneth Hobson - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):550-574.
    According to proponents of relational direct realism, veridical perceptual experiences are irreducibly relational mental states that include as constituents perceived physical objects or intrinsic aspects of them. One consequence of the theory is the rejection of the causal theory of perception. This paper defends the relational theory against several objections recently developed by Paul Coates. He argues that the required experiential relation is incoherent and unmotivated. The argument that it is incoherent commits a fallacy. In reply to the argument that (...)
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  • Bertrand Russell.David Pears (ed.) - 1972 - Garden City, N.Y.,: Anchor Books.
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