Physicians working in the world of competitive sports face unique ethical challenges, many of which center around conflicts of interest. Team-employed physicians have obligations to act in the club's best interest while caring for the individual athlete. As such, they must balance issues like protecting versus sharing health information, as well as issues regarding autonomous informed consent versus paternalistic decision making in determining whether an athlete may compete safely. Moreover, the physician has to deal with an athlete's decisions about performance (...) enhancement and return to play, pursuit of which may not be in the athlete's long-term best interests but may benefit the athlete and team in the short term. These difficult tasks are complicated by the lack of evidence-based standards in a field influenced by the lure of financial gains for multiple parties involved. In this article, we review ethical issues in sports medicine with specific attention paid to American professional football. (shrink)

In the United Kingdom (UK), ethical guidance for doctors assumes a therapeutic setting and a normal doctor–patient relationship. However, doctors with dual obligations may not always operate on the basis of these assumptions in all aspects of their role. In this paper, the situation of UK occupational physicians is described, and a set of models to characterise their different practices is proposed. The interaction between doctor and worker in each of these models is compared with the normal doctor–patient relationship, focusing (...) on the different levels of trust required, the possible power imbalance and the fiduciary obligations that apply. This approach highlights discrepancies between what the UK General Medical Council guidance requires and what is required of a doctor in certain roles or functions. It is suggested that using this modelling approach could also help in clarifying the sources of moral conflict for other doctors with “dual obligations” in their various roles. (shrink)

This paper explores the empirical evidence regarding the impact financial relationships on the behavior of health care providers, specifically, physicians. We identify and synthesize peer-reviewed data addressing whether financial incentives are causally related to patient outcomes and health care costs. We cover three main areas where financial conflicts of interest arise and may have an observable relationship to health care practices: physicians' roles as self-referrers, insurance reimbursement schemes that create incentives for certain clinical choices over others, and financial relationships between (...) physicians and the drug and device industries. We found a well-developed scientific literature consisting of dozens of empirical studies, some that allow stronger causal inferences than others, but which altogether show that such financial conflicts of interests can, and sometimes do, impact physicians' clinical decisions. Further research is warranted to document the causal relationship of such changes on health outcomes and the cost of care, but the current base of evidence is sufficiently robust to motivate policy reform. (shrink)

Physicians, scholars, and policymakers continue to be concerned about conflicts of interests among health care providers. At least two main types of objections to conflicts of interest exist. Conflicts of interests may be intrinsically troublesome if they violate providers’ fiduciary duties to their patients or they contribute to loss of trust in health care professionals and the health care system. Conflicts of interest may also be problematic in practice if they bias the decisions made by providers, adversely impacting patient outcomes (...) or wastefully increasing health care costs. This latter objection may be observed in differences in the prescriptions written, procedures performed, or costs billed by health care professionals who have conflicting interests, when compared to those that do not have such financial relationships. (shrink)

Professional sports with high rates of concussion have become increasingly concerned about the long-term effects of multiple head injuries. In this context, return-to-play decisions about concussion generate considerable ethical tensions for sports physicians. Team doctors clearly have an obligation to the welfare of their patient (the injured athlete) but they also have an obligation to their employer (the team), whose primary interest is typically success through winning. At times, a team’s interest in winning may not accord with the welfare of (...) an injured player, particularly when it comes to decisions about returning to play after injury. Australia’s two most popular professional football codes—rugby league and Australian Rules football—have adopted guidelines that prohibit concussed players from continuing to play on the same day. I suggest that conflicts of interest between doctors, patients, and teams may present a substantial obstacle to the proper adherence of concussion guidelines. Concussion management guidelines implemented by a sport’s governing body do not necessarily remove or resolve conflicts of interest in the doctor–patient–team triad. The instigation of a concussion exclusion rule appears to add a fourth party to this triad (the National Rugby League or the Australian Football League). In some instances, when conflicts of interest among stakeholders are ignored or insufficiently managed, they may facilitate attempts at circumventing concussion management guidelines to the detriment of player welfare. (shrink)