Although Considered By A Few Critics That The Sentence Structures Of The Book Are Quite Incomprehensible And Almost Unbearable To Read, The Book Is An Essential ...

In spite of extensive research on corporate social responsibility (CSR) and its link with economic and social performance, few studies have investigated the institutional determinants of CSR. This article draws upon neo-institutional theory and comparative institutional analysis to compare the influence of different institutional environments on CSR policies of European firms. On the basis of a dataset of European firms, we find that firms from the more liberal market economies of the Anglo-Saxon countries score higher on most dimensions of CSR (...) than firms in the more coordinated market economies (CMEs) in Continental Europe. This result lends support to the view of voluntary CSR practices in liberal economies as being a substitute for institutionalized forms of stakeholder participation. Meanwhile, CSR tends not to mirror more institutionalized forms of stakeholder coordination. Instead, in CMEs, CSR often takes on more implicit forms. Our analysis also shows that national institutional and sectoral-level factors have an asymmetric effect - strongly influencing the likelihood of firms adopting 'minimum standards' of CSR, but having little influence on the adoption of 'best practices'. (shrink)

Abstract: In this article, I offer a proposal to clarify what I believe is the proper relation between value maximization and stakeholder theory, which I call enlightened value maximization. Enlightened value maximization utilizes much of the structure of stakeholder theory but accepts maximization of the long-run value of the firm as the criterion for making the requisite tradeoffs among its stakeholders, and specifies long-term value maximization or value seeking as the firm’s objective. This proposal therefore solves the problems that arise (...) from the multiple objectives that accompany traditional stakeholder theory. I also discuss the Balanced Scorecard, which is the managerial equivalent of stakeholder theory, explaining how this theory is flawed because it presents managers with a scorecard that gives no score—that is, no single-valued measure of how they have performed. Thus managers evaluated with such a system (which can easily have two dozen measures and provides no information on the tradeoffs between them) have no way to make principled or purposeful decisions. The solution is to define a true (single dimensional) score for measuring performance for the organization or division (and it must be consistent with the organization’s strategy), and as long as their score is defined properly, (and for lower levels in the organization it will generally not be value) this will enhance their contribution to the firm. (shrink)

This article sets out to undertake a thorough, point-by-point examination of the theory postulated by Campbell (2007), in which an attempt is made to specify the conditions under which corporations may or may not act in socially responsible ways. In order to ensure the overall reliability of our study, and to attempt to provide a new understanding of, and greater insights into, whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) is affected by financial and institutional variables, we empirically investigate a total of 520 (...) financial firms in 34 countries, between the years 2003 and 2005. Our empirical findings are: (i) finns with larger size are more CSR minded, and the financial performance and CSR are not related; (ii) finns would actually act in more socially responsible ways to enhance their competitive advantages when the market competitiveness is more intense; (iii) financial firms in countries with stronger levels of legal enforcement tend to engage in more CSR activities; however, interestingly and rather strikingly, those finns in countries with stronger shareholder rights tend to engage in less CSR activities; and (iv) self-regulation within the financial industry has a significantly positive effect on CSR, with firms being found to act in more socially responsible ways in those countries which have more cooperative employer-employee relations, higher quality management schools, and a better macroeconomic environment. (shrink)

This article seeks to bring a focus to the significance of trade and finance in corporate governance outcomes. It explores the theoretical and historical link between micro-economic-level firm structure and macro-economic institutions such as trade and finance. The more open the economy, it argues, the more difficult it is in the long run to sustain an insider model. It then argues that changes in interdependent aspects of macro-economic policy in the UK and the US—primarily trade liberalization and the end of (...) capital controls—combined with the presence of developed capital markets and a self-regulatory ethos, allowed institutional investors to refocus the market-level rules on shareholders despite the managerial bias of their legal systems, and enabled the emergence of the outsider shareholder-oriented systems present there today. The article then argues that core insider systems such as those in Germany and France operated with different financing arrangements which meant that they were less susceptible to immediate change. However, in the long run global economic conditions have continued to push shareholder-oriented norms on insider systems. The article concludes that if these conditions persist, then governments will lose, or may indeed already have lost, sovereignty with regard to choice of corporate governance system. (shrink)