All humans have an equal basic moral status. They possess the same fundamental rights, and the comparable interests of each person should count the same in calculations that determine social policy. Neither supposed racial differences, nor skin color, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, intelligence, nor any other differences among humans negate their fundamental equal worth and dignity. These platitudes are virtually universally affirmed. A white supremacist racist or an admirer of Adolf Hitler who denies them is rightly regarded as beyond the (...) pale of civilized dialogue. However, a very simple line of argument developed by Peter Singer challenges our understanding of these platitudes and forces us to rethink the basis and nature of the moral equality of all humans. What I call the “Singer Problem” arises if one accepts that the morally significant cognitive capacities that are relevant to the determination of the fundamental moral status of a being vary from individual to individual by degree. The problem is to specify a moral principle determining fundamental moral status that assigns a superior status to humans compared to other animals on the basis of the superior cognitive capacities of humans but also assigns all human persons an equal fundamental moral status regardless of their differing cognitive capacities. More broadly posed, the problem is to specify moral principles that yield intuitively satisfactory implications for the treatment of human individuals and other individual animals given that cognitive capacities differ across species and individuals. A search for a resolution of the Singer problem leads to disappointing results. (shrink)

There is a latent distinction in Scheler’s middle-period philosophical anthropology between personal uniqueness as divinely determined and as self-determined. The first dimension is more explicit; the second, a logical conclusion from Scheler’s notion of person as pure spirit. In the following study I will first thematize these two aspects of personal uniqueness. Then, I will explore Scheler’sidea that one gains knowledge of these aspects of a person through love. Here Scheler’s differentiation between love as intuitive and love as participative serves (...) to justify and further explain the above distinction in personal uniqueness. Through intuitive love one is especially able to grasp the divinely determined dimension of another, her ideal and individual value essence. Through participative love one is especially able to grasp that dimension of another’s uniqueness which she herself forms through her own freedom. (shrink)

This book makes four bold claims: 1) life is an ultimate datum, open to philosophical analysis and irreducible to physical reality; hence all materialist-reductionist explanations - most current theories - of life are false. 2) All life presupposes soul (_entelechy_) without which a being would at best _fake_ life. 3) The concept of life is _analogous_ and the most direct access to life in its irreducibility is gained through consciousness; 4) All life possesses an objective and intrinsic value that needs (...) to be respected, human life possesses beyond this an inviolable dignity. Life and personal life are pure perfections, it being absolutely better to possess (personal) life than not to possess it. Chapter 1: the metaphysical essence and the many meanings of 'life,' as well as its 'transcendental' character. Chapter 2: the irreducibility of _biological life_, its amazing empirical and philosophically intelligible essential features, and the ways of knowing them. Chapter 3: the immediate evidence and indubitable givenness of mental, conscious life as well as questions of (brain-) death and immortality. Chapter 4: the inviolable objective dignity of personal life and its self-transcendence; a new theory of the fourfold source of human dignity and rights. Chapter 5 (in dialogue-form): methods and results of philosophy versus those of empirical life-sciences. (shrink)

This monograph constitutes a response to the criticisms of Christianity outlined in Nietzsche's GENEOLOGY OF MORALS, in which Nietzsche argues that Christianity is a "slave revolt" of the weak--an attempt by the impotent to bring down the vitality of the capable nobility. Scheler's response is multi-faceted but centers on Nietzsche's failure to understand the nature of Christian love. Christianity is not a destructive enterprise trying to bring everyone down to the same low level of its impotent faithful, who must put (...) their trust in the next world because they can get nowhere in this one. Rather, it attempts constructively to bring everyone up to a new level of human flourishing. Christianity's preoccupation with the poor, weak, and marginalized stems from a recognition, through divine love, of the miracle of God's creation and infinite possibilities present even in them. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals ranks alongside Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics as one of the most profound and influential works in moral philosophy ever written. In Kant's own words its aim is to search for and establish the supreme principle of morality, the categorical imperative. Kant argues that every human being is an end in himself or herself, never to be used as a means by others, and that moral obligation is an expression of the (...) human capacity for autonomy or self-government. This edition presents the acclaimed translation of the text by Mary Gregor, together with an introduction by Christine M. Korsgaard that examines and explains Kant's argument. (shrink)

Scheler’s theory of the person is at the center of his philosophy and one of the most celebrated of his achievements. It is somewhat surprising, then, that a straightforward and sufficient account of the person is missing from his works, an omission felt most keenly in that work which is in large measure dedicated to forging a new personalism: The Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values. In his explicit accounts of what a person is, Scheler stresses its spirituality (...) and claims that it lives and has its being wholly in the execution of its acts. But in forging his personalism, Scheler makes a number of claims which require an account of the person that reaches deeper than its executed acts. In this essay, I focus on the accounts of the person given in the Formalism and use Scheler toimprove Scheler’s theory of the person. (shrink)

A central but somewhat obscure concept in Scheler’s philosophy is that of person. I suggest that one aid to understanding Scheler’s notion of person is interpreting it in terms of what I call a tripartite anthropology. This term is meant to suggest that the human being can be conceived as comprising three distinct though characteristically cooperating sources of conscious activity. Once we understand Scheler’s anthropology in these terms, his concept of person becomes clearer. In this paper, I develop the notion (...) of a tripartite anthropology, including some discussion of its roots in the tradition. Second, I offer an overview of Scheler’s own anthropology, offering some account of the three-fold sources of activity in the human being and how they function together. Finally, I discuss Scheler’s anthropology in comparison to a section of Aquinas’s On Spiritual Creatures. I show that Scheler is not as far from Aquinas as it might seem and can actually help us to understand Aquinas’s intentions. (shrink)