One thing that would profit both the frustrated readers of Sellars and Sellars himself would be a careful attempt to explicate and evaluate critically the many interrelated theses stated and defended by Sellars. But, so far as I know, there has been little work of this kind done. I know only of two fine reviews by Keith Lehrer and Gilbert Harman, and a very helpful expository article by Richard Bernstein that deal directly and in some detail with Sellars' work. This (...) is not to mention, however, the many philosophers, including myself, who have been influenced by his work. What I believe would be most helpful at this point would be a critique of some central thesis in Sellars' work, that is, an attempt to raise objections to this thesis and to refute the replies that can be anticipated, based upon other of Sellars' claims. This is what I shall try to do in this paper. My hope is that it will further the understanding of his complex philosophy, and help carry forward discussion of the philosophical issues involved. (shrink)

James Cornman has recently offered a definition for ‘observation term’ which he takes to meet most, if not all, of the standard objections to such definitions. He also employs this definition against certain materialists, but in what follows I wish only to address myself to the proposed definition. I shall argue that he has failed to show any logical difference between “observation terms,” as he defines them, and terms which are not so classified. I shall show that his definition is (...) too restrictive. (shrink)