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  1. Towards a Modest Legal Moralism.R. A. Duff - 2014 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (1):217-235.
    After distinguishing different species of Legal Moralism I outline and defend a modest, positive Legal Moralism, according to which we have good reason to criminalize some type of conduct if it constitutes a public wrong. Some of the central elements of the argument will be: the need to remember that the criminal law is a political, not a moral practice, and therefore that in asking what kinds of conduct we have good reason to criminalize, we must begin not with the (...)
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  • Coercive proposals [rawls and gandhi].Vinit Haksar - 1976 - Political Theory 4 (1):65-79.
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  • Wrongness and criminalization.V. Tadros - 2012 - In Andrei Marmor (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law. New York , NY: Routledge. pp. 157--173.
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  • Rule Violations and Wrongdoings.R. A. Duff - 2002 - In Stephen Shute & Andrew Simester (eds.), Criminal law theory: doctrines of the general part. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 47--74.
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  • Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science Investigation.Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley - 2004 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 24 (2):173-205.
    Having a criminal justice system that imposes sanctions no doubt does deter criminal conduct. But available social science research suggests that manipulating criminal law rules within that system to achieve heightened deterrence effects generally will be ineffective. Potential offenders often do not know of the legal rules. Even if they do, they frequently are unable to bring this knowledge to bear in guiding their conduct, due to a variety of situational, social, or chemical factors. Even if they can, a rational (...)
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  • The expressive function of punishment.Joel Feinberg - 1965 - The Monist 49 (3):397–423.
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  • Punishment as Language.Igor Primoratz - 1989 - Philosophy 64 (248):187 - 205.
    A number of philosophers and legal scholars have pointed out a fact about punishment that had not been sufficiently appreciated by many traditional accounts, utilitarian, retributive, or ‘mixed’: that evil inflicted on the person punished is not an evil simpliciter , but rather the expression of an important social message—that punishment is a kind of language. The message which it is seen to communicate can broadly be described as condemnation by society of the crime committed. In what is still the (...)
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  • The Possibility of Choice: Three Accounts of the Problem with Coercion.Japa Pallikkathayil - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11.
    There is a strong moral presumption against the use of coercion, and those who are coerced seem to be less responsible for the actions they were coerced to perform. Both these considerations seem to reflect the effect of coercion on the victim’s choice. This paper examines three ways of understanding this effect. First, I argue against understanding victims as unable to engage in genuine action. Next, I consider the suggestion that victims are unable to consent to participate in the coercer’s (...)
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  • The normative concept of coercion.Cheyney C. Ryan - 1980 - Mind 89 (356):481-498.
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  • Coming Clean About the Criminal Law.James Edwards - 2011 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (3):315-332.
    This paper addresses three doctrinal phenomena of which it finds evidence in English law: the quiet extension of the criminal law so as to criminalise that which is by no means an obvious offence; the creation of offences the goal of which is not to guide potential offenders away from crime; and the existence of offending behaviour which is not itself thought to justify arrest or prosecution. While such phenomena have already been criticised by other criminal law theorists, this paper (...)
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