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  1. Conservatism in a simple probability inference task.Lawrence D. Phillips & Ward Edwards - 1966 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 72 (3):346.
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  • Sample size and the revision of subjective probabilities.Cameron R. Peterson, Robert J. Schneider & Alan J. Miller - 1965 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 69 (5):522.
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  • Absolute judgments of discrete quantities randomly distributed over time.Dwight E. Erlick - 1964 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 67 (5):475.
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  • The perception of probability.C. R. Gallistel, Monika Krishan, Ye Liu, Reilly Miller & Peter E. Latham - 2014 - Psychological Review 121 (1):96-123.
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  • Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1983 - Psychological Review 90 (4):293-315.
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  • Simultaneous over- and underconfidence: The role of error in judgment processes.Ido Erev, Thomas S. Wallsten & David V. Budescu - 1994 - Psychological Review 101 (3):519-527.
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  • Support theory: A nonextensional representation of subjective probability.Amos Tversky & Derek J. Koehler - 1994 - Psychological Review 101 (4):547-567.
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  • Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk.D. Kahneman & A. Tversky - 1979 - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society:263--291.
    The following values have no corresponding Zotero field: PB - JSTOR.
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  • Surprisingly rational: Probability theory plus noise explains biases in judgment.Fintan Costello & Paul Watts - 2014 - Psychological Review 121 (3):463-480.
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