Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Playing God in Frankenstein’s Footsteps: Synthetic Biology and the Meaning of Life. [REVIEW]Henk van den Belt - 2009 - NanoEthics 3 (3):257-268.
    The emergent new science of synthetic biology is challenging entrenched distinctions between, amongst others, life and non-life, the natural and the artificial, the evolved and the designed, and even the material and the informational. Whenever such culturally sanctioned boundaries are breached, researchers are inevitably accused of playing God or treading in Frankenstein’s footsteps. Bioethicists, theologians and editors of scientific journals feel obliged to provide an authoritative answer to the ambiguous question of the ‘meaning’ of life, both as a scientific definition (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • Bioethics and cloning, part I.Susan Cartier Poland & Laura Jane Bishop - 2002 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12 (3):305-323.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12.3 (2002) 305-323 [Access article in PDF] Scope Note 41 Bioethics and Cloning, Part I Susan Cartier Poland and Laura Jane Bishop This is Part One of a two part Scope Note on Bioethics and Cloning. Part Two will be published in the December 2002 issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal and as a separate reprint. Contents For Parts 1 And 2 (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Cloning.Ruth F. Chadwick - 1982 - Philosophy 57 (220):201 - 209.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Safety, identity and consent: A limited defense of reproductive human cloning.Robert Lane - 2006 - Bioethics 20 (3):125–135.
    Some opponents of reproductive human cloning have argued that, because of its experimental nature, any attempt to create a child by way of cloning would risk serious birth defects or genetic abnormalities and would therefore be immoral. Some versions of this argument appeal to the consent of the person to be conceived in this way. In particular, they assume that if an experimental reproductive technology has not yet been shown to be safe, then, before we use it, we are morally (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations