Article (Reprinted in "Oxford Readings in Philosophy: Nietzsche", edited by B. Leiter and J. Richardson, Oxford University Press, 2001.

I have argued elsewhere that Nietzsche’s genealogical critique of religion and morality requires a cognitivist epistemology, including a correspondence conception of truth. In this essay I pose ten crucial questions concerning the consistency of Nietzsche’s epistemology with his genealogy: Does Nietzsche hold that the world is a totally characterless flux? Does he hold that there is a metaphysical distinction between appearance and reality? Does he believe that there is cognitively useful perceptual access to the world? Does he believe that there (...) is a distinction between language and reality? Does he hold that there are representations? Does he hold that (some) language is capable of expressing what is made available by the senses? Is Nietzsche himself limited by the inadequacies of language that bar others from knowledge? Does his talk of the ‘creation’ of truth have non-cognitivist implications? Does his ‘perspectivism’ entail non-cognitivism? Is Nietzsche’s perspectivism self-referentially consistent? In answering these questions, I defend Nietzsche’s consistency and his cognitivism by showing that his views on ‘philology’ respond to his own critique of language and that his ‘perspectivism’ is self-referentially consistent and is consistent with his cognitivism. (shrink)