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Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter K. Unger - 1975 - Oxford [Eng.]: Oxford University Press.details
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Moral writings.H. A. Prichard - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Jim MacAdam.details
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How knowledge works.John Hyman - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):433-451.details
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(2 other versions)The Concept of Mind: 60th Anniversary Edition.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - New York: Hutchinson & Co.details
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Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980.Bernard Williams - 1981 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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(1 other version)Ignorance : a case for scepticism.Peter Unger - 1975 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 166 (3):371-372.details
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(1 other version)Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter Unger - 1975 - Philosophy 50 (194):489-490.details
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(1 other version)The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1 (4):328-332.details
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What Is The Basis of Moral Obligation?H. A. Prichard - 2002 - In Jim MacAdam (ed.), Moral Writings. Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press.details
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A disjunctive conception of acting for reasons.Jennifer Hornsby - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and evidence.John Hyman - 2006 - Mind 115 (460):891-916.details
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(1 other version)Duty and Ignorance of Fact.H. A. Prichard - 1932 - Philosophy 8 (30):226-228.details
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A disjunctivist conception of acting for reasons.Jennifer Hornsby - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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