The paper addresses the intuitions of aestheticians concerning a fundamental contrast between the judgement, appreciation, and interest appropriate to artworks and those judgements, appreciations, and interests appropriate to all the other (non-art) cases of aesthetic interest. Then terms such as beauty must amount to something different in art-cases from that in other (aesthetic) cases. For the fact of being an artwork is transfigurational, allowing artistic properties to be (truly) ascribed. In arguing against the univocality of terms such as beauty (by (...) stressing occasion-sensitivity), the paper rejects the idea of a ‘look of the thing’ shared by art and non-art. And the pervasiveness of this artistic/aesthetic contrast is urged. (shrink)

Iris Murdoch's moral philosophy has long influenced contemporary ethics, yet it has not, in general, received the kind of sustained critical attention that it deserves. "Existentialists and Mystics" and "Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals" provide new access to most of Murdoch's philosophical writings and make possible a deeper appreciation of her contribution to current thought. After assessing the recent critical reception of Murdoch's thought, this review places her moral philosophy in the context of contemporary trends in ethics by tracing (...) her influence on the work of Charles Taylor, highlights the distinctive features of her moral philosophy, and suggests future directions for Murdochian ethics. (shrink)

It seems often to have been assumed by art theorists and aestheticians that concepts of art and the aesthetic are related, if not actually identical. In recent times, however, David Best has criticized this widespread assumption in the interests of marking a quite radical distinction between artistic and aesthetic concerns. But this claim may be considered problematic in turn, not only in terms of its denial of the conventional conception of art as implicated in the production of aesthetic effects, but (...) also because it obscures our understanding of the objectivity of aesthetic judgement – and hence, ultimately, of the rational basis of artistic appreciation and endeavour. In the light of some critical attention to Joseph Dunne’s recent work on practical reason in Aristotle, the following paper argues that a suitably modified notion of phronesis may provide the key to understanding the relationship of aesthetic sensibility to artistic knowledge. (shrink)