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Free Will and Quantum Mechanics

The Monist 103 (4):415-426 (2020)

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  1. What do philosophers believe?David Bourget & David J. Chalmers - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):465-500.
    What are the philosophical views of contemporary professional philosophers? We surveyed many professional philosophers in order to help determine their views on 30 central philosophical issues. This article documents the results. It also reveals correlations among philosophical views and between these views and factors such as age, gender, and nationality. A factor analysis suggests that an individual's views on these issues factor into a few underlying components that predict much of the variation in those views. The results of a metasurvey (...)
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  • (5 other versions)The Will To Believe.William James - 1997 - The Philosophers' Magazine 1 (1):52-57.
    IN the recently published Life by I.eslie Stephen of his brother, Fitz- James, there is an account of a school to which the latter went when he was a boy. The teacher, a certain Mr. Guest, used to converse with his pupils in this wise: "Gurney, what is the difference between justification and sanctification?- Stephen, prove the omnipotence of God " etc. In the midst of our Harvard freethinking and indifference we are prone to imagine that here at your good (...)
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  • Introduction - the nature of naturalism.David Macarthur & Mario De Caro - 2004 - In Mario De Caro & David Macarthur (eds.), Naturalism in Question. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. pp. 1-20.
    The critical concern of the present volume is contemporary naturalism, both in its scientific version and as represented by newly emerging hopes for another, philosophically more liberal, naturalism.1 The papers collected here are state-of-the-art discussions that question the appeal, rational motivations, and presuppositions of scientific naturalism across a broad range of philosophical topics. As an alternative to scientific naturalism, we offer the outlines of a new non- reductive form of naturalism and a more inclusive conception of nature than any provided (...)
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  • Living without free will: The case for hard incompatibilism.Derk Pereboom - 2002 - The Journal of Ethics 6 (3):477-488.
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  • (1 other version)Living without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):494-497.
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  • Jamesian Free Will, The Two-stage Model Of William James.Bob Doyle - 2010 - William James Studies 5:1-28.
    Research into two-stage models of “free will” – first “free” random generation of alternative possibilities, followed by “willed” adequately determined decisions consistent with character, values, and desires – suggests that William James was in 1884 the first of a dozen philosophers and scientists to propose such a two-stage model for free will. We review the later work to establish James’s priority. By limiting chance to the generation of alternative possibilities, James was the first to overcome the standard two-part argument against (...)
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  • On Action.Carl Ginet - 1990 - Mind 100 (3):390-394.
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  • My Compatibilist Proposal.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - In Free Will and Luck. New York, US: Oxford University Press.
    This chapter defends a history-sensitive compatibilist view of free action and moral responsibility against various criticisms by compatibilists. It constructs a new argument for incompatibilism that makes vivid a problem that luck poses for compatibilism: the zygote argument. It is argued that the zygote argument is much more powerful than more familiar arguments for incompatibilism, and that, even so, compatibilism may survive the attack.
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  • The complex tapestry of free will: striving will, indeterminism and volitional streams.Robert Kane - 2019 - Synthese 196 (1):145-160.
    The aim of this paper is to respond to recent discussion of, and objections to, the libertarian view of free will I have developed in many works over the past four decades. The issues discussed all have a bearing on the central question of how one might make sense of a traditional free will requiring indeterminism in the light of modern science. This task involves, among other things, avoiding all traditional libertarian appeals to unusual forms of agency or causation that (...)
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  • Free Will: it's a normal biological property, not a gift or mystery.Robert O. Doyle - 2009 - Nature 459:1052.
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  • On the Problem of Hidden Variables in Quantum Mechanics.J. S. Bell - 2004 - In John Stewart Bell (ed.), Speakable and unspeakable in quantum mechanics: collected papers on quantum philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1--13.
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  • A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will.Robert Kane - 2007 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 69 (1):185-186.
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  • (1 other version)Free Will and Illusion.Saul Smilansky - 2001 - Mind 110 (437):271-274.
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  • Probability in the Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.Lev Vaidman - 2012 - In Yemima Ben-Menahem & Meir Hemmo (eds.), Probability in Physics. Springer. pp. 299--311.
    It is argued that, although in the Many-Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics there is no ``probability'' for an outcome of a quantum experiment in the usual sense, we can understand why we have an illusion of probability. The explanation involves: a). A ``sleeping pill'' gedanken experiment which makes correspondence between an illegitimate question: ``What is the probability of an outcome of a quantum measurement?'' with a legitimate question: ``What is the probability that ``I'' am in the world corresponding to that (...)
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  • Why agent-caused actions are not lucky.Meghan Griffith - 2010 - American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (1):43-56.
    Philosophers like to worry about luck. And well they should. Luck poses potential difficulties for knowledge, moral appraisal, and freedom. The primary target of this paper will be the last of these concerns . Recent arguments from luck have been levied against libertarian accounts of free will, including agent-causal ones. One general goal of this paper will be to demonstrate the truth of an often overlooked claim about responsibility-undermining luck. Part of this task will include illustrating what is genuinely worrisome (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Freedom and Belief.Galen Strawson - 1989 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 51 (4):742-743.
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  • (1 other version)Free Will and Illusion.Saul Smilansky - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):222-229.
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  • (2 other versions)Freedom and Belief.Galen Strawson - 1988 - Mind 97 (387):481-484.
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  • La Nouvelle Cuisine.J. S. Bell - 2004 - In John Stewart Bell (ed.), Speakable and unspeakable in quantum mechanics: collected papers on quantum philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 232--248.
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  • (1 other version)Fischer on Moral Responsibility. [REVIEW]Peter Inwagen - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (188):373 - 381.
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  • Naturalism, Realism, and Normativity.HilaryHG Putnam - 2016 - Harvard University Press.
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  • Fischer on moral responsibility.Peter van Inwagen - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (188):373–381.
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  • (1 other version)Living without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):308-310.
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  • An essay on free will.Peter van Inwagen & A. Phillips Griffiths - 1985 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 175 (4):557-558.
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  • Is liberal naturalism possible?Mario de Caro & Alberto Voltolini - 2010 - In Mario De Caro & David Macarthur (eds.), Naturalism and Normativity. Cambridge University Press. pp. 69-86.
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  • (2 other versions)Freedom and Belief.Galen Strawson - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (2):177-179.
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