This article investigates the liberal political implications of Michael Oakeshott’s political theory of civility and civil association by focusing on his judicious attempts to abate contingency. It argues that Oakeshott’s political theory can be best understood as ‘political pluralism’, aimed at the maximalist accommodation of abundant and fluctuating human pluralities, individual and associational. By reinterpreting Oakeshott as a defender of civil society, composed of numerous purposive associations, against state-imposed monism, it argues that in Oakeshott’s theory civil association is devised to (...) protect associational freedom, thereby keeping civil society as free as possible. It then discusses the distinctiveness of Oakeshott’s characteristically ‘liberal’ political theory by critically engaging it with two dominant strands of liberalism, namely, liberal pluralism and political liberalism. (shrink)

In this paper, I reinterpret Michael Oakeshott’s idea of a liberal self through the conceptual framework of Foucault’s theory of the aesthetics of the self. Oakeshott believes that agents can create themselves as a “style” or a distinctive shape. This style is a “virtuosity,” an artistic achievement that is also an “excellence” in itself. Oakeshott’s liberal version of the aesthetics of the self is a new way to think about what Foucault’s argument might mean. Oakeshott’s theory is an internal challenge (...) to liberalism insofar as liberalism is purportedly a theory of individuality and the unalienable worth of each person; but for Oakeshott, this individuality pertains to the agent gaining a distinctive style, sustaining “distinctness,” not achieving “distinction.” Oakeshott draws our attention to how distinctness is undermined by the forces of conformity and “normality” in existing liberal society. I also argue that the purportedly “radical” social policy of the basic income, which, while in tension with parts of Oakeshott’s theory, provides all citizens the opportunity to enjoy his particular idea of the self. (shrink)

Michael Oakeshott provides the best articulation of the widespread view that the moral foundations of the modern state limit it to the defense and maintenance of a system of formal rules governing individuals and non-state enterprises. While this understanding of the proper relation between individual and state has been challenged by liberals of a more Rawlsian persuasion, these criticisms have persuaded few to change their minds, as they rest upon assumptions that are plainly incompatible with the view under consideration. I (...) argue that, rightly understood, central and attractive features of Oakeshott’s own conception of understanding, philosophy, individuality, and education lead to significantly different conclusions than those embraced by Oakeshott himself. The “morality of individuality” upon which Oakeshott rests his strict restrictions on the use of state power requires that we be open to the use of that power to guarantee that all receive the education postulated by individuality. (shrink)

This article investigates the liberal political implications of Michael Oakeshott’s political theory of civility and civil association by focusing on his judicious attempts to abate contingency. It argues that Oakeshott’s political theory can be best understood as ‘political pluralism’, aimed at the maximalist accommodation of abundant and fluctuating human pluralities, individual and associational. By reinterpreting Oakeshott as a defender of civil society, composed of numerous purposive associations, against state-imposed monism, it argues that in Oakeshott’s theory civil association is devised to (...) protect associational freedom, thereby keeping civil society as free as possible. It then discusses the distinctiveness of Oakeshott’s characteristically ‘liberal’ political theory by critically engaging it with two dominant strands of liberalism, namely, liberal pluralism and political liberalism. (shrink)

This article argues that Oakeshott's theory of freedom possesses a greater degree of coherence than is often perceived. Freedom in Oakeshott's philosophy may be defined as `recognized contingency', combining the notions of a genuine choice of action and of an agent's awareness of having such a choice. Oakeshott employs his notion of freedom in two different contexts. One is the context in which freedom is understood as a concept distinguishing what is conceived as `human' from what is conceived as `non-human'. (...) The other context is that of membership in societies, which under certain circumstances can be characterized either by the presence or the lack of freedom. The article argues that, while at first glance Oakeshott's ideas look counter-intuitive, at a deeper level this understanding of freedom is akin to that prevalent in the consciousness of modern liberal societies. (shrink)