Book reviewed in this article: Principles of Biomedical Ethics. By Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress.

In her provocative discussion of the challenge posed to the traditional impartialist, justice-focused conception of morality by the new-wave care perspective in ethics, Annette Baier calls for ‘a “marriage” of the old male and newly articulated female... moral wisdom,’ to produce a new ‘cooperative’ moral theory that ‘harmonize[s] justice and care.’ I want in this paper to play matchmaker, proposing one possible conjugal bonding: a union of two apparently dissimilar modes of what Nel Noddings calls ‘meeting the other morally,’ a (...) wedding of respect and care. (shrink)

This paper examines the ‘justice’ and ‘care’ orientations in ethical theory as characterized in Carol Gilligan's research on moral development and the philosophical work it has inspired. Focus is placed on challenges to the justice orientation – in particular, to the construal of impartiality as the mark of the moral point of view, to the conception of moral judgment as essentially principle-driven and dispassionate, and to models of moral responsibility emphasizing norms of formal equality and reciprocity. Suggestions are made about (...) the implications of these challenges, and of the care orientation in ethics, for the ethical theory taught, the issues addressed, and the skills and sensitivities encouraged through bioethical education. Keywords: bioethical education, ethics of care, impartiality, moral judgment, moral psychology CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Knowledge needed for ethical care must be constructed in the relationship between professional and patient who strive together to understand what meaning the disease factors have within the experience of the individual patient. Three kinds of knowledge are described. The first two, descriptive knowledge and abstract knowledge, are part of the more comprehensive and complex inherent knowledge. The reality of human experience and meaning is profoundly more complex than the scientific approach of fragmentation for purposes of dissection and diagnosis. In (...) order to develop descriptive, abstract and inherent knowledge as outlined here, three moves need to be made: the move from dominance to collaboration, the move from abstraction to context, and the move from beneficence to nurturance. (shrink)

There is a growing body of writing, for instance from the nursing profession, espousing an approach to ethics based on care. I suggest that this approach is hopelessly vague and that the vagueness is due to an inadequate analysis of the concept of care. An analysis of 'care' and related terms suggests that care is morally neutral. Caring is not good in itself, but only when it is for the right things and expressed in the right way. 'Caring' ethics assumes (...) wrongly that caring is good, thus it can tell us neither what constitutes those right things, nor what constitutes the right way. (shrink)