In his Tanner Lecture of 1979 called ‘Equality of What?’ Amartya Sen asked what metric egalitarians should use to establish the extent to which their ideal is realized in a given society. What aspect of a person’s condition should count in a fundamental way for egalitarians, and not merely as cause of or evidence of or proxy for what they regard as fundamental?

Amartya Sen has made a major contribution to the theory of social justice, and of gender justice, by arguing that capabilities are the relevant space of comparison when justice-related issues are considered. This article supports Sen's idea, arguing that capabilities supply guidance superior to that of utility and resources (the view's familiar opponents), but also to that of the social contract tradition, and at least some accounts of human rights. But I argue that capabilities can help us to construct a (...) normative conception of social justice, with critical potential for gender issues, only if we specify a definite set of capabilities as the most important ones to protect. Sen's "perspective of freedom" is too vague. Some freedoms limit others; some freedoms are important, some trivial, some good, and some positively bad. Before the approach can offer a valuable normative gender perspective, we must make commitments about substance. (shrink)

We have a reason to use information which is available about such genes in our reproductive decision-making; (3) couples should selec.

The question of the moral status of human nature is today being posed above all under the influence of medical and biotechnological aspects. These facilitate not only an increasing number of, but also increasingly far-reaching interventions and manipulations in humans, so that the perspective of a gradual "technologization" of his physical constitution can no longer be regarded as merely utopian. Some authors are convinced that this disturbing development can only be halted when an inherent value is (once again) ascribed to (...) human nature. After a short description of this situation (I), the following paper first examines the difficulties that arise as regards an adequately precise descriptive definition of human nature (II) and, in a second step, the problems posed by the necessity to define the normative status of human nature (III). It hereby comes to the conclusion that a precise definition of "human nature" is not possible for fundamental reasons, and that only a weak normativity can be warranted. (shrink)

Today the problem of responsible parenthood is frequently reduced to the question of whether or not a couple actually desires to have a child. In medical circles the same question is reduced even further to a choice between the various forms of medical assistance available to a couple who might desire to have a child, but who have been unsuccessful in their own efforts. As a counterbalance to this narrowing process, it would seem appropriate to ask a number of questions (...) which in fact ought to precede it: Why do we want children in the first place? What are we really looking for in our desire to have children? What does it actually mean to have children?In attempting to answer these questions, our course will be a philosophical one, focusing on the meaning of our actions and the reality which surrounds us. Philosophy is unlikely to uncover new facts in such an investigation; its task is simply to examine the presuppositions present prior to our interpretation of the data that emerge from this. Our answers to the questions surrounding our desire for children and the meaning of parenthood must come prior to the available facts on the matter for the simple reason that it will define the significance that these facts will have for us.The questions frequently raised in ethical, pedagogical and juridical literature concerning the rights of parents and children with respect to one another must also precede our examination of the facts. Rights and obligations always pertain to a specific relationship. Knowledge of such relationships is presumed, therefore, when we go about discussing the rights and obligations of the parties involved. By exploring the presuppositions which make our questioning and understanding of the facts possible, philosophy endeavours to create a space wherein we can look at things differently, a space where new and different possibilities are opened up. While we admit that philosophy is not going to uncover new facts, it will, if it works, produce new possibilities for understanding the facts and give them meaning.In this paper, I would like to begin by offering a description of the love parents feel for their children. In the second section I will attempt to draw some conclusions from this description concerning our desire to have the children we do not yet have. In the final section I will endeavour to situate these conclusions in a somewhat broader context. (shrink)

Does a human right to healthcare imply individual obligations to healthy behavior? Or put another way: Is a self-induced condition a relevant criterion for some sort of restriction of this right—like withholding or modifying treatment in circumstances where choices have to be made? For instance, should a drunk driver bear the costs of medical care that he needs after a car accident he has caused? Should there be a difference in healthcare entitlements between the smoker with a heart attack who (...) is seriously overweight and the 60-year old man who has always taken excellent care of himself and is suddenly stricken by leukemia? And how should we think about the risk-taking behavior of all the persons going on a skiing holiday or an exotic hiking trip? a. (shrink)