The idea that a republic is the only legitimate form of government and that non-elective monarchy and hereditary political privileges are by definition illegitimate is an artifact of late eighteenth century republicanism, though it has roots in the “godly republics” of the seventeenth century. It presupposes understanding a republic ( respublica) to be a non-monarchical form of government. The latter definition is a discursive practice that goes back only to the fifteenth century and is not found in Roman or medieval (...) sources. This article explains how the definition emerged in Renaissance Italy. (shrink)

In 1830, members of the Belgian National Congress asserted that they would not attempt to create an ideal constitution. Rather, they wanted to frame a constitution which would take the existing order into account, which would be adapted to Belgian manners and customs. Their ‘pragmatic conservatism’, as it can be described in distinction to Burke's juridical conservatism, was to an important degree inspired by the writings of Montesquieu. Both the discussion on the monarchy and the debate on the senate were (...) influenced by the Esprit des lois. Indirectly, the debates in the National Congress give evidence of the enormous influence of the Esprit des lois on political thought in the Restoration period. (shrink)

If a comparison is made between the constitutional principles of 1831 with regard to the working of the parliamentary system and presentday political practice, then it appears that there has been an evolution in which the role of the parties is fundamental. Until about 1850 virtually no party-system existed in Belgium. The monarchy supported by the conservative forces of the nobility, the church and the landowners controlled the system. In the second half of the century there was a simultaneous increase (...) in the influence of parliament and the breakthrough of economic and political liberalism without the parties yet being able to impose the rules. Such rule making did not happen until around the turn of the century when the civil parliament became democratic and the big parties became integrated within it. From then on control over parliament and executive decision-taking came about through the party-structures. The period of crisis preceding the second world war obviously weakened this trend considerably; after 1945 it re-emerged even more strongly. (shrink)

After presenting the recent republican revival, focusing in particular on the neo-republican school of thought, this chapter assesses the exact nature of the differences between liberalism and republicanism, and notably the republicanism of freedom as non-domination associated with Philip Pettit. Drawing on the tools of ideological analysis, as laid out by Michael Freeden, it shows that some of these disagreements are conceptual; others are normative; and yet others are strategic. In particular, republicans have a distinctive understanding of the concept of (...) liberty; their focus on non-domination and ‘anti-power’ shapes a more comprehensive, progressive political agenda; and their language is more effective as a critique of real-world neoliberal politics. (shrink)

Constitutional precedence constitutes a defining element of modern constitutionalismConstitutionalism. This chapter aims to elucidate the way in which this idea was embedded in the Belgian ConstitutionConstitutionBelgian 1831 of 1831. It does so by combining a historical-genealogical approach with a legal one. The chapter begins with a discussion of the genesis of the Belgian ConstitutionConstitutionBelgian 1831 in relation to the Fundamental LawConstitutionDutch 1815 of the United Kingdom of the NetherlandsNetherlands, United Kingdom of the. It shows how the Belgian opposition’s constitutional resistance (...) to government policy created a debate over the interpretation of the Fundamental LawConstitutionDutch 1815, which in turn provided the conceptual building blocks for the understanding of constitutional precedencePrecedence of constitution in the 1831 Constitution. After examining the concept of legal order, the chapter explains how, in the eyes of the Belgian revolutionaries, the Belgian ConstitutionConstitutionBelgian 1831 could be a legitimate replacement for the Fundamental LawConstitutionDutch 1815 as the foundational document of the state. The concern for constitutional precedencePrecedence of constitution was expressed furthermore by recurring debates within the National CongressNational Congress, Belgian and the press over the constitutionality of the acts of both the constituting and constituted powers. The chapter then turns to the constitutional text and analyzes the way the precedence of the Constitution was legally anchored into the Belgian state system. Constitutional precedence was expressed by a combination of measures concerning the special status and the endurance of constitutional law as compared to ordinary law and the Constitution’s status as the legally binding ground rule for the constituted powers. Finally, the precedence of the Constitution was symbolically expressed by a discourse of respect for the Constitution as the ultimate guaranteeConstitutionalguarantee of the wellbeing of the state. (shrink)