We have seen that despite Feferman's results Gödel's second theorem vitiates the use of Hilbert-type epistemological programs and consistency proofs as a response to mathematical skepticism. Thus consistency proofs fail to have the philosophical significance often attributed to them.This does not mean that consistency proofs are of no interest to philosophers. We know that a ‘non-pathological’ consistency proof for a system S will use methods which are not available in S. When S is as strong a system as we are (...) willing to entertain seriously then a consistency proof for it will yield no epistemological gain. But in other cases philosophers might argue that the proof uses methods which are merely different rather than stronger than those available in the system in question. This claim has been made, for example, in the case of the constructive consistency proofs for elementary number theory. Similar philosophical investigations can be made on relative consistency proofs, since these differ from each other in the principles they employ. For example, most relative consistency proofs can be carried out within elementary number theory, but without using the theory of real numbers, no one has been able to prove the consistency of Quine's ML relative to that of his NF.What about the consistency of all mathematics or of some strong system for set theory? How do we answer the skeptic? Since here a convincing proof is not possible, we have established that the skeptic demands too much. We cannot be certain that our axioms are free from contradiction and must treat them as hypotheses which may be abandoned or modified in the face of further mathematical experience. This attitude is taken by many foundational workers who also go on to voice opinions about thelikelihood that various systems are consistent. Since these opinions are variously supported by appeals to the clarity of the mathematical concept formalized, the existence or non-existence of ‘weird’ models for the system and actual empirical experience with the system, this is surely a fruitful area for philosophical research. (shrink)