Certain kinds of medical treatment are often held to be morally unacceptable because they are an 'interference with nature'. I suggest a way in which we can make sense of such ideas. We can make significant choices only against a background of conditions which we regard as 'natural', and these will typically include such facts as those of birth and death, of youth and age, and of sexual relations. I argue, however, that such ideas, though intelligible, do not establish any (...) valid moral objection to, for instance, the use of ovarian tissue for assisted conception. (shrink)

Currently, brain tissue transplantations are being developed as a clinical-therapeutic tool in neurodegenerative diseases such as Parkinson's or Alzheimer's disease. From an ethical point of view, distinguishing between the preservation and an alteration of personal identity seems to be central to determining the scope for further application of brain tissue transplantation therapy. The purpose of this article is to review "standard" arguments which are used on the one hand by proponents to prove preservation of personal identity and by opponents on (...) the other hand to prove that brain tissue transplantation results in an altered personal identity. Proponents and opponents are shown to use the same arguments, albeit with different presuppositions. These presuppositions concern the meaning of the term "identity", either numerical or qualitative, the definition of brain identity, either structurally or functionally, and the relationship between mental states, psychological functions and neurophysiological properties as criteria for personal identity. Furthermore the respective neurophysiological, clinical and philosophical evidence for the different presuppositions are discussed. It is concluded that evaluation of personal identity in brain tissue transplantation should not only rely on the "standard" arguments but, additionally, neurophysiological, clinical and philosophical implications should be discussed. (shrink)

Outcomes from cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) remain distressingly poor. Overuse of CPR is attributable to unrealistic expectations, unintended consequences of existing policies and failure to honour patient refusal of CPR. We analyzed the CPR outcomes literature using the bioethical principles of beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy and justice and developed a proposal for selective use of CPR. Beneficence supports use of CPR when most effective. Non-maleficence argues against performing CPR when the outcomes are harmful or usage inappropriate. Additionally, policies which usurp good clinical (...) judgment and moral responsibility, thereby contributing to inappropriate CPR usage, should be considered maleficent. Autonomy restricts CPR use when refused but cannot create a right to CPR. Justice requires that we define which medical interventions contribute sufficiently to health and happiness that they should be made universally available. This ordering is necessary whether one believes in the utilitarian standard or wishes medical care to be universally available on fairness grounds. Low-yield CPR fails justice criteria. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation should be performed when justified by the extensive outcomes literature; not performed when not desired by the patient or not indicated; and performed infrequently when relatively contraindicated. (shrink)