Background: Empathy is a contested concept in the field of care ethics. According to its proponents, empathy is a unique way to connect with others, to understand what is at stake for them, and to help guide moral deliberation. According to its critics, empathy is biased, inaccurate or a form of projection that does not truly grasp and respect the otherness of the other, and that may be distorted by prejudices. Objectives: We aim to contribute to a better understanding of (...) the significance of empathy in care ethics by reviewing both the functions and limitations of empathy in this field. Research design: Drawing on literature from care ethics and closely related fields, we identify the relevant functions and limitations of empathy from the relational, epistemic, normative, and political perspectives. These perspectives are drawn from four main characteristics of care ethics, which serve as a concise framework for understanding the significance of empathy. Participants and research context: This article is written as part of an empirical and theoretical research project that aims to better understand the functions and limitations of empathy in care practices, from the perspective of care ethics. Ethical considerations: We try to do justice to both the appraisal and critique of empathy in the care ethics literature. Findings: Our findings stress that the relationship between care ethics and empathy is complicated and rife with opposing views. Therefore, we conclude that care ethics is not an ethics of empathy. Discussion and conclusion: Based on our findings, we formulate pathways that may guide the further analysis of empathy in care practices and care ethics. (shrink)

This groundbreaking handbook of character strengths and virtues is the first progress report from a prestigious group of researchers who have undertaken the systematic classification and measurement of widely valued positive traits. Character Strengths and Virtues classifies twenty-four specific strengths under six broad virtues that consistently emerge across history and culture. This book demands the attention of anyone interested in psychology and what it can teach about the good life.

In her essay ‘The Curious Coincidence of Feminine and African Moralities’ (1987), Sandra Harding was perhaps the first to note parallels between a typical Western feminist ethic and a characteristically African, i.e., indigenous sub-Saharan, approach to morality. Beyond Harding’s analysis, one now frequently encounters the suggestion, in a variety of discourses in both the Anglo-American and sub-Saharan traditions, that an ethic of care and an African ethic are more or less the same or share many commonalities. While the two ethical (...) perspectives are indeed sisters, in this article I argue, first, that they are not identical twins, and, more strongly, that the family resemblance between the two is significantly less than has been recognized. I highlight key differences between representative forms of an ethic of care and a sub-Saharan communitarian morality, after which I argue, second, that the latter better captures some central feminist concerns and moral considerations generally. That is, I maintain that an African ideal of community, when understood in a philosophically refined way, provides an important, relational corrective to the ethic of care. (shrink)

In the last few decades, the ethics of care as a feminist ethic has given rise to extensive literature, and has affected moral inquiries in many areas. It offers a distinctive challenge to the dominant moral theories: Kantian moral theory, utilitarianism, and virtue ethics. This chapter outlines the distinctive features and promising possibilities of the ethics of care, and the criticisms that have been made against it. It then examines the ethics of care’s recognition of human dependency and of the (...) importance of responding to needs; its interpretation of the roles of emotion and reason in moral understanding; and its critique of liberal individualism and development of a conception of the person as relational. The ethics of care contrasts care with justice, tries to integrate them, and reconceptualizes public and private life and morality. (shrink)

'Applied Ethics and Human Rights: Conceptual Analysis and Contextual Applications' offers a philosophical perspective to ethical problems by providing an ...

What makes individuals, groups, or even entire countries vulnerable? And why is vulnerability a concern in bioethics? A simple answer to both questions is that vulnerable individuals and groups are subject to exploitation, and exploitation is morally wrong. This analysis is limited to two areas. First is the context of multinational research, in which vulnerable people can be exploited even if they are not harmed, and harmed even if they are not exploited. Second is the situation of women, who are (...) made vulnerable in cultural settings or in entire countries in which they are oppressed and powerless. (edited). (shrink)

Alongside globalization, the sense of vulnerability among people and populations has increased. We feel vulnerable to disease as new infections spread rapidly across the globe, while disasters and climate change make health increasingly precarious. Moreover, clinical trials of new drugs often exploit vulnerable populations in developing countries that otherwise have no access to healthcare and new genetic technologies make people with disabilities vulnerable to discrimination. Therefore the concept of vulnerability has contributed new ideas to the debates about the ethical dimensions (...) of medicine and healthcare. This book explains and elaborates the new concept of vulnerability in today s bioethics. Firstly, Henk ten Have argues that vulnerability cannot be fully understood within the framework of individual autonomy that dominates mainstream bioethics today: it is often not the individual person who is vulnerable, rather that his or her vulnerability is created through the social and economic conditions in which he or she lives. Contending that the language of vulnerability offers perspectives beyond the traditional autonomy model, this book offers a new approach which will enable bioethics to evolve into a global enterprise. This groundbreaking book critically analyses the concept of vulnerability as a global phenomenon. It will appeal to scholars and students of ethics, bioethics, globalization, healthcare, medical science, medical research, culture, law, and politics.". (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant impact globally. Most affected, however, are those individuals and groups routinely disadvantaged by the social injustice created by the misdistribution of power, money, and resources. Simple measures that prevent the spread of COVID-19, such as frequent hand washing and social distancing, are unavailable to millions of people in the wealthiest of nations and in the poorest of nations. Disadvantaged groups are impacted more directly and in disproportionately higher numbers due to existing poor health, (...) and the disruption of services central to securing an income and an education will have lasting consequences for their futures. The unintended effect of exclusionary government policies is that privileged citizens and healthcare systems are also at greater risk. This paper seeks to highlight the impact of COVID-19 on those already suffering health inequities through consideration of some of the social determinants of health on groups in affluent and poorer nations. It also highlights some of the factors that may assist in tackling health inequities as we emerge from this pandemic. (shrink)

Carol Gilligan has delineated two ethics, the ethic of rights and the ethic of care. In this article I argue that the two ethics are part of one overall system, the ethic of care functioning as a necessary base for the ethic of rights. 1 also argue that the system is seriously flawed. Because women are held accountable to both ethics and because the two ethics frequently conflict, women recurrently find themselves in a moral double bind.

Regarding the determination of vulnerability, the bioethics community has univocally jettisoned “labelled groups”, groups whose membership confers a context-invariant “vulnerable” status to their members. While the usual reasons against the sole use of labelled groups to determine the vulnerability of individuals are sound, labelled groups as exemplars of vulnerability can play indispensable roles in bioethical reasoning. In this article, I argue against the wholesale jettisoning of labelled groups by showing how they can be useful.

JANET DELGADO RODRIGUEZ | : The concept of vulnerability is central to current developments in bioethics, not only because of its analytic nature, but also due to its capacity for criticism. However, this concept has not been sufficiently developed, neither in the area of moral philosophy nor in bioethics. For this reason, it is necessary to define and analyze the conceptual framework in which the notion of vulnerability has been developed within the scope of bioethics. Thus, the purpose of this (...) paper is to indicate how the concept of vulnerability in the field of bioethics has been developed and what the main problems that derive from this approach are. Secondly, the paper analyzes some of the main philosophical approaches that I consider should be articulated in the expansion of a critical bioethics approach focused on the notion of vulnerability. To address this issue, I analyze the reflections that we find in the work of Martha Fineman, emphasizing the main relevant aspects for bioethics. Finally, I highlight the main implications of a theory of vulnerability for bioethics. | : Le concept de vulnérabilité est au coeur des développements actuels de la bioéthique, non seulement en raison de sa nature analytique, mais aussi en raison de son potentiel critique. Cependant, ce concept n’a pas été suffisamment développé, que ce soit dans le domaine de la philosophie morale ou de la bioéthique. Pour cette raison, il est nécessaire de définir et d’analyser le cadre conceptuel dans lequel la notion de vulnérabilité a été développée en bioéthique. Ainsi, le but de cet article est d’indiquer comment le concept de vulnérabilité a été développé dans le domaine de la bioéthique et quels sont les principaux problèmes découlant de cette approche. Deuxièmement, l’article analyse certaines des principales approches philosophiques qui devraient selon moi être articulées à une approche bioéthique critique centrée sur la notion de vulnérabilité. Pour traiter ce problème, j’analyse la réflexion de Martha Fineman, en soulignant les principaux aspects pertinents pour la bioéthique. Enfin, je souligne les principales implications d’une théorie de la vulnérabilité pour la bioéthique. (shrink)

The pandemic caused by the SARS-CoV2 novel coronavirus is creating a global crisis. There is a global ambience of uncertainty and anxiety. In addition, nations have imposed strict and restrictive public health measures including lockdowns. In this heightened time of vulnerability, public cooperation to preventive measures depends on trust and confidence in the health system. Trust is the optimistic acceptance of the vulnerability in the belief that the health system has best intentions. On the other hand, confidence is assessed based (...) on previous experiences with the health system. Trust and confidence in the health system motivate people to accept the public health interventions and cooperate with them. Building trust and confidence therefore becomes an ethical imperative. This article analyses the COVID-19 pandemic in the south Indian state of Tamil Nadu and the state’s response to this pandemic. Further, it applies the Trust-Confidence-Cooperation framework of risk management to analyse the influence of public trust and confidence on the Tamil Nadu health system in the context of the preventive strategies adopted by the state. Finally, the article proposes a six-pronged strategy to build trust and confidence in health system functions to improve cooperation to pandemic containment measures. (shrink)