Most sociologists of science have accepted R. K. Merton's view that there is no intrinsic connection between the ideas scientists hold and the way they behave. Merton based his approach on an extended analogy between science and economics. He assumed a division between the scientific "product" governed by an inflexible a-social logic and the processes of scientiftc "production" propelled by "non-logical" social behavior. Kuhn rejects this "divorce of convenience" and argues that "local" traditions which resist rationalization characterize both the theory (...) and practice of science. Politics, law, and religion provide more apt analogies for scientift activity than economics. However, Kuhn's attempt to replace epistemology with sociology in order to retain the notion of progressiveness in science blunts his contribution. His sociological approach would be most fruitful if he adopted "epistemological agnosticism.". (shrink)