This paper argues that at least one of the following propositions is true: (1) the human species is very likely to go extinct before reaching a “posthuman” stage; (2) any posthuman civilization is extremely unlikely to run a significant number of simulations of their evolutionary history (or variations thereof); (3) we are almost certainly living in a computer simulation. It follows that the belief that there is a significant chance that we will one day become posthumans who run ancestor-simulations is (...) false, unless we are currently living in a simulation. A number of other consequences of this result are also discussed. (shrink)

To make progress on the problem of consciousness, we have to confront it directly. In this paper, I first isolate the truly hard part of the problem, separating it from more tractable parts and giving an account of why it is so difficult to explain. I critique some recent work that uses reductive methods to address consciousness, and argue that such methods inevitably fail to come to grips with the hardest part of the problem. Once this failure is recognized, the (...) door to further progress is opened. In the second half of the paper, I argue that if we move to a new kind of nonreductive explanation, a naturalistic account of consciousness can be given. I put forward my own candidate for such an account: a nonreductive theory based on principles of structural coherence and organizational invariance, and a double-aspect theory of information. (shrink)

This paper argues that at least one of the following propositions is true: the human species is very likely to go extinct before reaching a "posthuman" stage; any posthuman civilization is extremely unlikely to run a significant number of simulations of their evolutionary history ; we are almost certainly living in a computer simulation. It follows that the belief that there is a significant chance that we will one day become posthumans who run ancestor-simulations is false, unless we are currently (...) living in a simulation. A number of other consequences of this result are also discussed. (shrink)

I argue that at least one of the following propositions is true: the human species is very likely to become extinct before reaching a ’posthuman’ stage; any posthuman civilization is extremely unlikely to run a significant number of simulations of its evolutionary history ; we are almost certainly living in a computer simulation. It follows that the belief that there is a significant chance that we shall one day become posthumans who run ancestor-simulations is false, unless we are currently living (...) in a simulation. I discuss some consequences of this result. (shrink)

I develop a multilevel, holistic view of persons, emphasizing embodiment, emotions, consciousness, and the social self. In successive sections I draw from six sources: 1. Theology. The biblical understanding of the unitary, embodied, social self gave way in classical Christianity to a body‐soul dualism, but it has been recovered by many recent theologians. 2. Neuroscience. Research has shown the localization of mental functions in regions of the brain, the interaction of cognition and emotion, and the importance of social interaction in (...) evolutionary history and child development. 3. Artificial intelligence. Some forms of robotics use embodied systems that learn by interacting with their environment, but the possibilities for emotion, socialization, and consciousness in robots remain problematic. 4. Relations between levels. Concepts that can help us relate studies of neurons and persons include the hierarchy of levels, the communication of information, thebehavior of dynamic systems, and epistemological and ontological emergence. 5. Philosophy of mind. Two‐aspect theories of the mind‐brain relation offer an alternative between the extremes of eliminative materialism and the thesis that consciousness is irreducible. 6. Process philosophy. I suggest that process thought provides a coherent philosophical framework in which these themes can be brought together. It combines dipolar monism with organizational pluralism, and it emphasizes embodiment, emotions, a hierarchy oflevels, and the social character of selfhood. (shrink)

In the not-too-distant future, robots will populate the walks of everyday life, from the manufacturing floor to corporate offices, and from battlefields to the home. While most work on the social implications of robotics focuses on such moral issues as the economic impact on human workers or the ethics of lethal machines, scant attention is paid to the effect of the advent of the robotic age on religion. Robots will likely become commonplace in the home by the end of the (...) twenty-first century as nannies and caretakers, particularly for young children. As a consequence, parents will want to be assured that robots will instruct their children in their values, based upon the moral teachings of their religious tradition. Consequently, parents will need robots programmed with appropriate religious software, installed by corporations but approved by their religious communities, e.g., Catholic robots, Muslim robots, and Lutheran robots. If, as expected, robots will acquire the capacity to engage in independent reasoning, believers will want to incorporate their robots within their religious communities to influence the evolution of robotic religious views. The Robotic Age will therefore present basic theological challenges. If robots simulate human personalities, desires, and fears, can religious communities tailor their doctrine, rituals, and institutions to accommodate these new “converts”? In short, can religion generate “soulless” theologies for the non-human? The Robotic Age promises a challenge unlike any other in the history of religious traditions. Biofundamentalists will undoubtedly resist revolutionary changes in theology, but for many people of faith, it will be difficult to resist appealing to those who appear and act strikingly like human beings. This paper poses questions and entertains speculation about those theological challenges, particularly in Christianity, which believers will face, e.g., concepts of the soul, blood sacrifice and redemption, marriage, and death. (shrink)

The general typology for the dialogue between religion and science is built on the assumption that there is an objective world, one reality that can be described. In this paper, I present an alternative epistemological framework for the dialogue that understands all descriptions of reality as symbolic. Therefore, this understanding creates a new possibility for mutual enrichment between the two dialogue partners. I demonstrate the usefulness of this framework by applying it to the dialogue between artificial intelligence (AI) and theology. (...) I discuss an advanced AI project: Cog, a humanoid robot. After briefly describing this project, its assumptions, and the emotions it creates (mainly hope and fear), I show how the project can be enriched by theological insight. The concept ofimago Dei—the understanding of humans created in the image of God—can be applied to the Cog project especially when it is presented in a way that takes the metaphorical character of both theological and scientific theories seriously. (shrink)