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  1. Sentence-relativity and the necessary a posteriori.Kai-Yee Wong - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 83 (1):53 - 91.
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  • The autonomy of ethics.A. N. Prior - 1960 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):199 – 206.
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  • Some valid (but no sound) arguments trivially span the `is'-`ought' gap.Toomas Karmo - 1988 - Mind 97 (386):252-257.
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  • First Steps in a Philosophical Taxonomy.I. L. Humberstone - 1982 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):476-478.
    A.N. Prior once showed that on certain apparently reasonable assumptions, a thesis sometimes associated with the name of Hume to the effect that no set of factual statements can ever entail an evaluative statement, is quite untenable. We assume only that there is at least one statement of each kind, and that the negation of a factual statement is factual — a principle we may call ‘N'. Now consider the disjunction F V E of some factual with some evaluative statement. (...)
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  • First Steps in Philosophical Taxonomy.I. L. Humberstone - 1982 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):467-478.
    A.N. Prior once showed that on certain apparently reasonable assumptions, a thesis sometimes associated with the name of Hume to the effect that no set of factual statements can ever entail an evaluative statement, is quite untenable. We assume only that there is at least one statement of each kind, and that the negation of a factual statement is factual — a principle we may call ‘N'. Now consider the disjunction F V E of some factual with some evaluative statement. (...)
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  • A study in philosophical taxonomy.I. L. Humberstone - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 83 (2):121 - 169.
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  • Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe it.Ronald Dworkin - 1996 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 25 (2):87-139.
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  • Internalism and speaker relativism.James Dreier - 1990 - Ethics 101 (1):6-26.
    In this article I set out a reason for believing in a form of metaethical relativism. In rough terms, the reason is this: a widely held thesis, internalism, tells us that to accept (sincerely assert, believe, etc.) a moral judgment logically requires having a motivating reason. Since the connection is logical, or conceptual, it must be explained by a theory of what it is to accept a moral claim. I argue that the internalist feature of moral expressions can best be (...)
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  • Two notions of necessity.Martin Davies & Lloyd Humberstone - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 38 (1):1-31.
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