In this article, the authors investigate the applicability and usefulness of three alternative perspectives on corporate issues management: issue life cycle theory, legitimacy theory, and stakeholder theory. Each perspective makes certain as- sumptions about the nature of issues management activities and certain general predictions about corporate social responsiveness. The authors test the relative applicability of the three theories through a case study of the issues management activities of four large forestry companies in Finland and Canada. The authors conclude that all (...) three perspectives have value but differ in the level of analysis and time frame to which they apply. (shrink)

Responsible Care is a voluntary code of conduct developed, enforced, and monitored by the Chemical Manufacturers Association. Voluntary codes could be designed and enforced by regulators, nonprofit groups, industry associations, and individual firms. They could vary in their scope, focusing on firms around the globe, in a given region, within a country, or in a given industry. This article focuses on Responsible Care’s self-regulatory services that pertain to establishing, monitoring, and enforcing industry-wide environmental, health, and safety standards. Employing insights from (...) the club theory, stakeholder theory, institutionalist theory, and the corporate social performance perspective, it examines the demand and supply sides of voluntary codes. Finally, it discusses theoretical implications and the key challenges faced by Responsible Care in the future. (shrink)

Corporate philanthropy is considered to be an integral part of corporate social performance; however, this was not always the case. At one time, the use of corporate funds for philanthropy was illegal. This article uses institutional theory to examine the evolution of corporate philanthropy from its illegal status to the time when it became both legal and expected behavior on the part of business firms. Because institutional rules rarely change as dramatically as did those governing corporate philanthropy, an examination of (...) these changes provides a unique opportunity to begin development of more generalized theory concerning change in the institutional structure of business. (shrink)

This article presents an overview of traditional legal and regulatory incentives directed at achieving lawful corporate behavior, together with examples of more recent governmental incentives aimed at encouraging self regulation activities by corporations. These incentives have been differentiated into positive incentives that benefit corporations for actions that encourage or assist lawful behavior, and punitive incentives that only punish corporations for violations of legal or regulatory standards. This analysis indicates that traditional legal and regulatory incentives for lawful corporate behavior are overwhelmingly (...) punitive in their intended effects, while more recent governmental incentives to encourage voluntary corporate self regulation are much more positive in their intended effects.A prototype private compliance system containing typical features specified in governmental incentives for corporate self regulation was then analyzed applying the same positive/punitive analysis that was performed with the governmental incentives. This analysis suggests that corporate compliance programs that are structured to comply with Department of Defense regulations for defense contractors or the new Federal Organizational Sentencing Guidelines will reflect the same overwhelmingly punitive balance of incentives for lawful and ethical employee conduct as do the traditional legal and regulatory incentive systems for lawful corporate behavior. (shrink)

Lack of specificity around stakeholder identity remains a serious obstacle to the further development of stakeholder theory andits adoption in actual practice by business managers. Nowhere is this shortcoming more evident than in stakeholder theory’s treatment of the constituency known as “community.”In this paper we attempt to set forth what we call “the Problem of Community” as indicative of the definitional problems of stakeholdertheory. We then begin the process of gaining greater specificity around our notions of community and the role (...) of community in stakeholder theory and management. In doing so, we identify the emergence of two fairly new forms of community that we believe are particularly relevant to the stakeholder theorist and practicing manager. These two new variants of community—the virtual advocacy group and the community of practice—extend the notion of community in new directions, which have strikingly different implications for stakeholder theory and practice. (shrink)