This is an important book precisely because there is none other quite like it.

Helen Longino’s “contextual empiricism” is one of the most sophisticated recent attempts to defend a social theory of science. On this view, objectivity and epistemic acceptability require that research be produced within communities that approximate a Millian marketplace of ideas. I argue, however, that Longino’s embedding of her epistemology within the framework of Mill’s political liberalism implies a conception of individual epistemic agents that is incompatible with her view that scientific knowledge is necessarily social, and I begin to articulate an (...) alternative conception that is better suited to a truly social theory of science. †To contact the author, please write to: School of Public Policy, Georgia Institute of Technology, 685 Cherry Street, Atlanta, GA 30332‐0345; e‐mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

Claims that science should be more democratic than it is frequently arouse opposition. In this essay, I distinguish my own views about the democratization of science from the more ambitious theses defended by Paul Feyerabend. I argue that it is unlikely that the complexity of some scientific debates will allow for resolution according to the methodological principles of any formal confirmation theory, suggesting instead that major revolutions rest on conflicts of values. Yet these conflicts should not be dismissed as irresoluble.

As an alternative to the relativistic anti-objectivism that has been directed toward experimental science, I develop an account of objectivity in experimental inquiry. I argue for experimental testing procedures, gleaned from experimental practice, that can make the impact of the world strong enough for objectively establishing claims about the world. These procedures, I argue, can be used in the evaluation of any experimental inquiry to determine the extent to which intersubjective presuppositions in particular, shared theoretical presuppositions, are eliminated. ;It is (...) possible, I argue, to objectively establish a claim about a property by reporting on it with a number of independent techniques. It is also possible, I argue, to objectively establish a claim about a correlation or a causal relation by using sophisticated versions of Mill's methods that incorporate the transmission of marks between experimentally manipulated objects. Even when a target system cannot be experimentally manipulated, claims about correlations or causal relations can be objectively established by the use of model systems. When model systems are used, the objectivity of any claim depends on the strength of the analogy between the target system and the model system. ;The objectivity of any claim made by experimental inquiry is limited by the availability of independent techniques and appropriate model systems and by the extent to which the structure of the scientific community supports critical activities. These critical activities include both direct criticism of individual and shared presuppositions and intentional and de facto testing of claims about properties, correlations and causal relations. Therefore, when experimental knowledge is applied to the solution of practical problems, because of limitations on objectivity, it is necessary to judge whether any experimental claim is sufficiently objective to justify its use in the circumstances of a particular application. I examine the objectivity of experimental claims about the causal relations between human genes and human physical, behavioral and intellectual characteristics and their use in the development and interpretation of predictive genetic tests. (shrink)