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  1. (2 other versions)Mind and World.Huw Price & John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181.
    How do rational minds make contact with the world? The empiricist tradition sees a gap between mind and world, and takes sensory experience, fallible as it is, to provide our only bridge across that gap. In its crudest form, for example, the traditional idea is that our minds consult an inner realm of sensory experience, which provides us with evidence about the nature of external reality. Notoriously, however, it turns out to be far from clear that there is any viable (...)
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  • (2 other versions)On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
    Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses." Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action. These concepts are often partly or totally conflated, with bad results. This target article uses as an example a form of reasoning about a function of "consciousness" based on (...)
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  • The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems.D. W. Hamlyn & James J. Gibson - 1968 - Philosophical Review 77 (3):361.
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  • Molyneux's question.Gareth Evans - 1985 - In Collected papers. New York: Oxford University Press.
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