Aurel Kolnai; VI*—Forgiveness, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 74, Issue 1, 1 June 1974, Pages 91–106, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/74.1.

This book focuses on the degree to which certain moral and legal doctrines are rooted in specific passions that are then institutionalised in the form of criminal law. A philosophical analysis is developed of the following questions: when, if ever, should hatred be overcome by sympathy or compassion? What are forgiveness and mercy and to what degree do they require - both conceptually and morally - the overcoming of certain passions and the motivation by other passions? If forgiveness and mercy (...) indeed are moral virtues, what role, if any, should they play in the law? (shrink)

This article examines the view of forgiveness expounded in the classical Jewish sources. It is shown that traditional rabbinic authorities regarded the duty of one individual to forgive another as conditional upon the repentance of the offender, who has a prior duty to seek forgiveness from the person harmed. These same authorities appear to have extended the duty to forgive, in theory at least, to all offenses regardless of their severity. The religious underpinnings of this view are explored and contrasted (...) with the model of forgiveness presented in Paul Lauritzen's paper. The author concludes that the Judaic view of forgiveness as a moral imperative has been shaped decisively by the beliefs in a compassionate God whom we have a duty to emulate and in the special cove- nantal relationship established between this God and Israel. (shrink)