Approximately 62,000 people in this country await organ transplants. Ten years ago the waiting list numbered 16,000. The line gets longer every day. Up to 30% of those waiting in line will die waiting. We face a chronic shortage of organs. While demand for organs steadily increases, the number of cadaveric organ donors remains relatively constant: approximately 4,000 in 1988, and approximately 5,500 in 1997. In response to this environment of scarcity, policymakers have considered initiatives in a number of domains.

The transplant community has quietly initiated efforts to expand the current pool of cadaver organ donors to include those who are dead by cardiac criteria but cannot be pronounced dead using brain-based criteria. There are many reasons for concern about "policy creep" regarding who is defined as a potential organ donor. These reasons include loss of trust in the transplant community because of confusion over the protocols to be used, blurring the line between life and death, stress on family members, (...) and burdens imposed on health care providers when a long-standing policy regarding who can serve as a cadaver organ donor is unilaterally changed. While these concerns are not sufficient reason for abandoning efforts to broaden existing eligibility standards for cadaver donation, they are sufficient reasons for the transplant community to desist in changing existing standards without widespread professional and public discussion. (shrink)

The dead donor rule—that persons must be dead before their organs are taken—is a central part of the moral framework underlying organ procurement. Efforts to increase the pool of transplantable organs have been forced either to redefine death (e.g., anencephaly) or take advantage of ambiguities in the current definition of death (e.g., the Pittsburgh protocol). Society's growing acceptance of circumstances in which health care professionals can hasten a patient's death also may weaken the symbolic importance of the dead donor rule. (...) We consider the implications of these efforts to continually revise the line between life and death and ask whether it would be preferable to abandon the dead donor rule and rely entirely on informed consent as a safeguard against abuse. (shrink)

It is common to interpret Rawls's maximin theory of justice as egalitarian. Compared to utilitarian theories, this may be true. However, in special cases practices that distribute resources so as to benefit the worst off actually increase the inequality between the worst off and some who are better off. In these cases the Rawlsian maximin parts company with what is here called true egalitarianism. A policy question requiring a distinction between maximin and "true egalitarian" allocations has arisen in the arena (...) of organ transplantation. This case is examined here as a venue for differentiating maximin and true egalitarian theories. Directed donation is the name given to donations of organs restricted to a particular social group. For example, the family of a member of the Ku Klux Klan donated his organs on the provision that they go only to members of the Caucasian race. While such donations appear to be discriminatory, if certain plausible assumptions are made, they satisfy the maximin criterion. They selectively advantage the recipient of the organs without harming anyone. Moreover, everyone who is lower on the waiting list is advantaged by moving up on the waiting list. This paper examines how maximin and more truly egalitarian theories handle this case arguing that, to the extent that directed donation is unethical, the best account of that conclusion is that an egalitarian principle of justice is to be preferred to the maximin. (shrink)