Switch to: Citations

References in:

The Body, Thought Experiments, and Phenomenology

In Yiftach J. H. Fehige & Harald Wiltsche (eds.), Thought Experiments in Philosophy, Science, and the Arts (2012)

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. (1 other version)The Laboratory of the Mind: Thought Experiments in the Natural Sciences.James Robert Brown - 1991 - New York: Routledge.
    Newton's bucket, Einstein's elevator, Schrödinger's cat – these are some of the best-known examples of thought experiments in the natural sciences. But what function do these experiments perform? Are they really experiments at all? Can they help us gain a greater understanding of the natural world? How is it possible that we can learn new things just by thinking? In this revised and updated new edition of his classic text _The Laboratory of the Mind_, James Robert Brown continues to defend (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   135 citations  
  • Experiment and the Making of Meaning: Human Agency in Scientific Observation and Experiment.D. C. Gooding - 1994 - Springer.
    ... the topic of 'meaning' is the one topic discussed in philosophy in which there is literally nothing but 'theory' - literally nothing that can be labelled or even ridiculed as the 'common sense view'. Putnam, 'The Meaning of Meaning' This book explores some truths behind the truism that experimentation is a hallmark of scientific activity. Scientists' descriptions of nature result from two sorts of encounter: they interact with each other and with nature. Philosophy of science has, by and large, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   87 citations  
  • Are Thought Experiments Just What You Thought?John D. Norton - 1996 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):333 - 366.
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 26, pp. 333-66. 1996.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   135 citations  
  • What is Experimental about Thought Experiments?David C. Gooding - 1992 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:280 - 290.
    I argue that thought experiments are a form of experimental reasoning similar to real experiments. They require the same ability to participate by following a narrative as real experiments do. Participation depends in turn on using what we already know to visualize, manipulate and understand what is unfamiliar or problematic. I defend the claim that visualization requires embodiment by an example which shows how tacit understanding of the properties of represented objects and relations enables us to work out how such (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  • Husserl’s transcendental philosophy and the critique of naturalism.Dermot Moran - 2008 - Continental Philosophy Review 41 (4):401-425.
    Throughout his career, Husserl identifies naturalism as the greatest threat to both the sciences and philosophy. In this paper, I explicate Husserl’s overall diagnosis and critique of naturalism and then examine the specific transcendental aspect of his critique. Husserl agreed with the Neo-Kantians in rejecting naturalism. He has three major critiques of naturalism: First, it (like psychologism and for the same reasons) is ‘countersensical’ in that it denies the very ideal laws that it needs for its own justification. Second, naturalism (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • I’d Love to Be a Naturalist—if Only I Knew What Naturalism Was.Lawrence Sklar - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (5):1121-1137.
    Naturalists tell us to rely on what science tells about the world and to eschew aprioristic philosophy. But foundational physics relies internally on modes of thinking that can only be called philosophical, and philosophical arguments rely upon what can only be called scientific inference. So what, then, could the naturalistic thesis really amount to?
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Ancient Thought Experiments.Katerina Ierodiakonou - 2005 - Ancient Philosophy 25 (1):125-140.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • The Procedural Turn; or, Why Do Thought Experiments Work?David Gooding - 1992 - In R. Giere & H. Feigl (eds.), Cognitive Models of Science. University of Minnesota Press. pp. 45-76.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Analytical thought experiments.C. Mason Myers - 1986 - Metaphilosophy 17 (2-3):109-118.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • The role of variation in thought experiments.Nebojsa Kujundzic - 1998 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 12 (3):239 – 243.
    The main concern of this paper is to show that understanding mental variation may prove to be relevant to inquiry into thought experiments. First, I examine why Ernst Mach considered the ability to vary the contents of one's thoughts the principal requirement for thought experimentation. Second, I illustrate the wide applicability of mental variation in thought experiments. Third, I suggest, following Kathleen Wilkes, that variation is frequently employed in “realistic” thought experiments.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations