- Towards a Reasonable Libertarianism.David Wiggins - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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‘Could’, Possible Worlds, and Moral Responsibility.Terence Horgan - 1979 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):345-358.details
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Preferences, conditionals and freedom.Keith Lehrer - 1980 - In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor. D. Reidel. pp. 187--201.details
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Towards a reasonable libertarianism.David Wiggins - 1973 - In Ted Honderich (ed.), Essays on Freedom of Action. Boston,: Routledge and Kegan Paul. pp. 31.details
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The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism.Peter Van Inwagen - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (3):185 - 199.details
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Bringing about the past.Michael Dummett - 1964 - Philosophical Review 73 (3):338-359.details
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The conditional analysis of freedom.Carl Ginet - 1980 - In P. van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor. Reidel. pp. 171-186.details
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On a proof of incompatibilism.James W. Lamb - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (January):20-35.details
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Compatibilism and control over the past.Richard Foley - 1979 - Analysis 39 (March):70-74.details
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‘Could’, possible worlds, and moral responsibility.Terence Horgan - 1979 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):345-358.details
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The Incompatibility of Responsibility and Determinism.Peter van Inwagen - 1980 - Bowling Green Studies in Applied Philosophy 2:30-37.details
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Compatibilism defended.Jan Narveson - 1977 - Philosophical Studies 32 (July):83-7.details
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