I argue for the possibility of posthumous harm based on an account of the harm of murder. I start with the deep-seated intuition that when someone is murdered he (or she) is harmed (over and above the pain of injury or dying), and argue that Feinberg's account that assumes that harm is an invasion of an interest cannot plausibly accommodate this intuition. I propose a new account of the harm of murder: it is an irreversible loss of functions necessary for (...) worthwhile existence. I suggest a (partial) loss analysis of harm in general, and then go on to apply it to posthumous harm and defend the idea that there can be posthumous losses. (shrink)

Dramatic changes in medical technology challenge mankind’s traditional ways of diagnosing death. Death, Brain Death and Ethics examines the concept of death against the background of these changes, as well as ethical and philosophical issues arising from attempts to redefine the boundaries of life. In this book, David Lamb supports the use of brain-related criteria for the diagnosis of death, and proposes a new clinical definition of death based on both medical and philosophical principles. Death, Brain Death and Ethics articulates (...) the case for a brain death standard, while presenting an informed viewpoint on what constitutes the end points of human life. Although the book is written from a philosophical standpoint, it raises fundamental questions regarding the meaning of life and death, and will interest lay-persons, lawyers, and physicians. Death, Brain Death and Ethics is sure to prompt discussion and reflection on some of the philosophical beliefs which underlie clinical practice. (shrink)