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  1. Averaging the truth-value in Ĺ‚ukasiewicz logic.Daniele Mundici - 1995 - Studia Logica 55 (1):113 - 127.
    Chang's MV algebras are the algebras of the infinite-valued sentential calculus of ukasiewicz. We introduce finitely additive measures (called states) on MV algebras with the intent of capturing the notion of average degree of truth of a proposition. Since Boolean algebras coincide with idempotent MV algebras, states yield a generalization of finitely additive measures. Since MV algebras stand to Boolean algebras as AFC*-algebras stand to commutative AFC*-algebras, states are naturally related to noncommutativeC*-algebraic measures.
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  • Partially Undetermined Many-Valued Events and Their Conditional Probability.Franco Montagna - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (3):563-593.
    A logic for classical conditional events was investigated by Dubois and Prade. In their approach, the truth value of a conditional event may be undetermined. In this paper we extend the treatment to many-valued events. Then we support the thesis that probability over partially undetermined events is a conditional probability, and we interpret it in terms of bets in the style of de Finetti. Finally, we show that the whole investigation can be carried out in a logical and algebraic setting, (...)
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  • On the logical structure of de Finetti's notion of event.Tommaso Flaminio, Lluis Godo & Hykel Hosni - 2014 - Journal of Applied Logic 12 (3):279-301.
    This paper sheds new light on the subtle relation between probability and logic by (i) providing a logical development of Bruno de Finetti's conception of events and (ii) suggesting that the subjective nature of de Finetti's interpretation of probability emerges in a clearer form against such a logical background. By making explicit the epistemic structure which underlies what we call Choice-based probability we show that whilst all rational degrees of belief must be probabilities, the converse doesn't hold: some probability values (...)
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