Third wave anti-essentialist critique has too often been used to dismiss second wave feminist projects. I examine claims that Carol Gilligan's work is "essentialist," and argue that her recent research requires this criticism be rethought. Anti-essentialist feminist method should consist in attention to the relations of power that construct accounts of gendered identity in the course of different forms of empirical enquiry, not in rejecting any general claim about women or girls.

The defects of any form of government may be either negative or positive. It is negatively defective if it does not concentrate in the hands of the authorities power sufficient to fulfil the necessary offices of a government; or if it does not sufficiently develop by exercise the active capacities and social feelings of the individual citizens. On neither of these points is it necessary that much should be said at this stage of our inquiry.

S. 39: "My project in this paper is to develop the initial distinction which I have drawn between recognition and appraisal respect into a more detailed and specific account of each. These accounts will not merely be of intrinsic interest. Ultimately I will use them to illuminate the puzzles with which this paper began and to understand the idea of self-respect." 42 " Thus, insofar as respect within such a pursuit will depend on an appraisal of the participant from the (...) perspective of whatever standards are held to be appropriate to the pursuit, such respect will depend on a judgement to which excellences of character are thought relevant. Note that exactly what aspect of the person's character is thought to be relevant in this instance is his recognition respect (or lack of it) for the standards of the pursuit." 44 "This attitude fails of being appraisal respect in that my having it toward the person is conditional on those traits being such as to make him server a particular purpose that I happen to have" 44 - 45 "To sum up: Appraisal respect is an attitude of positibe appraisal of a person either judged as a person or as engaged in some more specific pursuit. In the first case, the appropriate grounds are features of the person's character: dispositions to act for particular reasons or a higher-level disposition to act for the best reasons. In the second case, though features of character do not exhaust the appropriate grounds for appraisal respect, some such character traits will be relevant (recognition respect for the standards of a particular pursuit). Also, the other features which constitute the appoprate excellences of the pursuit must be related to traits of character in the way specified. In both cases, the positive appraisal of the person, and of his traits, must be categorical. It cannot depend on the fact that the person, because of his traits, serves an interest or purpose of one's own." 45 "To have recognition respect for someone as a person is to give appropriate weight to the fact that he or she is a person by being willing to constrain one's behaviour in ways required by that fact." 45 "This is rather different from having an attitude of appraisal respect for someone as a person. The latter is a positive appraisal oif an individual made with regard ti those features which are excellences of persons. As such, it is not owed to everone, for it may or may not be merited. When it is, what is merited is just the positive appraisal itself." 47 "Second, the only beings who are approriate objects of appraisal respect are those who are capable of acting for reasons and hence capable of conceiving of various facts as meriting more or less consideration in deliberation.". (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, Volume 52, Issue 4, Page 473-490, Winter 2021.

Journal of Social Philosophy, Volume 52, Issue 4, Page 491-515, Winter 2021.

Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.

Judging Virtuously: Developing an Empathic Capacity for Perceptual Sensitivity: A Review of Amalia Amaya and Ho Hock Lai , Law, Virtue and Justice.

The case for gender equality on the bench wouldseem too uncontroversial to requirejustification. Yet the practical realities ofthe slow progress of women towards equality ofparticipation both quantitative and qualitativein the judiciary testifies to the continuingneed to argue the case for change. To date, theprimary rationale for promoting gender equalityhas been that women will bring a uniquecontribution to the bench as a result of theirdifferent life experiences, values andattitudes. Such arguments derived fromdifference theory have had a strong appealsince they appear to (...) give legitimacy to theundervalued attributes traditionally associatedas feminine while also promoting the meritprinciple by claiming to improve the quality ofjustice. However, this article argues thatdifference theory arguments are theoreticallyweak, empirically questionable andstrategically dangerous. Instead, it argues forthe adoption of a rationale for gender equalitybased on equity and legitimacy; that equalparticipation of men and women in the justicesystem is an inherent and essential feature ofa democracy without which the judiciary willlose public confidence. This approach, thoughless immediately appealing, is ultimately moresound. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, Volume 52, Issue 4, Page 459-472, Winter 2021.

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.