In Contours of Dignity, Suzanne Killmister sets out an original and innovative approach to understanding dignity. She considers the relationship between dignity and respect, the ways in which shame and humiliation can constitute dignity violations, and the links between dignity and human rights. Departing from the dominant conception of dignity as an inherent feature of all human beings, Killmister instead ties dignity to personal and social standards. She argues for a tripartite theory--comprised of personal dignity, social dignity, and status dignity--in (...) which dignity is to be understood in terms of the norms to which we hold ourselves and others. This revised understanding opens the door to a rich exploration of the moral significance of dignity, and the ways in which dignity can be violated, frustrated, or destroyed. These fresh insights can then help us understand the distinctively dignitarian harms that are inflicted on people when they are tortured, humiliated, or disrespected. Killmister concludes by offering a novel account of human rights, one that is built upon the idea that the 'human' in human rights should be interpreted as a socially constructed category. (shrink)

The concept of dignity plays a foundational role in the more recent versions of Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities theory. However, despite its centrality to her theory, Nussbaum’s conception of dignity remains under-theorised. In this paper we critically examine the role that dignity plays in Nussbaum’s theory by, first, developing an account of the concept of dignity and introducing a distinction between two types of dignity, status dignity and achievement dignity. Next, drawing on this account, we analyse Nussbaum’s conception of dignity and (...) contrast it with Kant’s conception of dignity. On the basis of this comparison between Nussbaum and Kant, we highlight tensions between Nussbaum’s Aristotelianism, which is central to her conception of dignity, and her commitment to political liberalism. This leads us to conclude that Nussbaum’s claim that her conception of dignity is only a partial political conception is implausible and that her conception of dignity seems to commit her to a satisficing form of perfectionist liberalism. (shrink)

Appeals to the dignity of people with dementia are widespread in the current literature on dementia care. One influential account of dignity in the wider philosophical and bioethical literature that has remained underexplored in the context of dementia care is that of Martha Nussbaum. This paper critically examines Nussbaum’s account of dignity and aims to determine what moral guidance this account can offer for the provision of care to people with dementia. To that end, first, I identify four possible objections (...) to appeals to dignity in dementia care. These objections are (1) redundancy of the dignity talk, (2) exclusionary implications, (3) reliance on (suspect forms of) speciesism and (4) unclear practical implications. Then, I discuss whether, and to what extent, Nussbaum’s account of dignity can overcome these objections. I argue that Nussbaum’s account, in its original form, struggles to overcome the problem of exclusionary implications and consequently the problem of unclear practical implications. I argue for a modified version of Nussbaum’s account of dignity. I demonstrate that this modified version can better overcome all of the four objections, and it provides relatively clearer moral guidance for the provision of care to people with dementia. The modified version of Nussbaum’s account is predicated on a novel dementia-specific model of flourishing, which draws on Kitwood and Bredin’s empirically informed list of indicators of well-being for people with dementia. (shrink)